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Abstract 
 
 
The thesis examines the nature of the organization, both as a whole and as a stage set up for the 
members to interact. Chapter One considers why and how an organization as a whole, represented by 
its name, holds reputation, like a natural person, even thought it, unlike the latter, has no fixed self, or 
“type” as called in economics. The chapter finds that having names hold reputations improves the 
economic efficiency; it also discovers two mechanisms that drive organizational reputation. Chapter 
Two considers the optimal allocation of ownership of physical capital. The effect of the allocation on 
control receives little attention in the literature and is the focus of the chapter. Control means here to 
affect the project choice of the agent, while incentive means the choice of ex ante human capital 
investment and ex post effort. The chapter finds that the principal ownership improves control, yet 
reduces incentive of the agent, compared to the agent ownership; thus the former, called “integration”, 
happens iff the benefit of coordination outweighs the loss in incentive. Chapter Three provides a new 
angle of delineating the boundary of the firm, by the allocation of the liability to investors. In a Towsend 
economy, it examine all modes of financing, each defined by the according allocation of the liability; 
particularly, Financial intermediation (FI) is defined by the fact the monitor alone takes the liability. The 
real race is between FI and Conglomeration, where the entrepreneurs and the monitor form a 
conglomerate to take the liability. FI has “Number Advantage”: when default is declared, the investors 
audit one bank asset under FI but many entrepreneur projects under conglomerate. Conglomeration 
has “Collateral Advantage”: its collateral is the pool of the projects contains as a part the bank asset, 
the collateral of FI. Both FI and Conglomeration implement the benefit of diversification; indeed, under 
the perfect diversification, Conglomeration is as good as FI. The chapter thus challenges the view that 
the benefit of diversification drives Financial Intermediation (FI), a view first established by Diamond 
(1984) and well accepted by the literature.  
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Introduction
The thesis examines the nature of the organization, both as a whole (Chapter 1) and as a stage
or framework set up for economic agents to interact (Chapters 2 and 3).
There is abundant economic research that take a rm in itself as an economic agent that,
like a natural person, has utility of its own and is capable of making strategic decisions. Chap-
ter 1 does not take that approach which is based on personication of organizations. Rather,
its objective is to study why we personify organizations, in so many ways: we let them take
liability; we compose histories of them, as if they have a constant identication; we do moral
evaluations upon them, as if they can behave; and what is the most important from the eco-
nomicsperspective, we let them hold reputations, the reason of which the chapter examines.
Organizational reputation is established and evolves in a similar way to personal reputation, but
there is a di¤erence in nature between the two. A persons reputation is anchored by the persons
physical or psychological characteristics, which constitute his "self" or "type" (as is called in
economics), and are supposed to change little over his life. On the contrary, there is no such a
type to anchor organizational reputation. The performance of an organization is decided by the
aggregate quality of its member, but the members come and go from time to time and by no
physical reason those coming are at the same level of quality as those gone. And the reputation
of an organization often live long after the members who actually establish the reputation have
gone.
The chapter examines the economic mechanisms that drive organizational reputation. It
nds that organizational reputation is actually a genius device invented by human beings to
improve the economic e¢ ciency. The intuition is as follows. Reputation is important for us to
handle information asymmetry problems. Personal reputation do help with the problems; for
example, the adverse selection problem besetting a obscure youth is alleviated when a reputable
senior writes a reference for him to certicate his quality. But personal reputation dies with
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the person who holds it. This fate of reputation is saved if it is held by an organization, which
is inanimate and can technically live for ever; then reputation keep functioning long after the
person who establishes it has gone, which improves e¢ ciency.
More elaborately, organizational reputation works in the following way. The achievements
of reputable seniors confer reputation not only on them personally, but also on the organization
which they belong to. Nobody youths joins the reputable organization to signal their quality,
which is not directly observable to others. This is equivalent to the way of the seniors writing
references. In other words, organizational reputation is another channel, alternative to direct
reference, through which a nobody borrows reputation from a somebody. This channel has an
advantage over direct reference, namely that it does not require personal contact between the
nobody and the somebody; indeed the former can benet from the latter of hundreds years ago.
With the time passing by, the youths could remain being nobodies, or become somebodies
themselves. Again, their performance not only confers personal reputation to themselves, but
also contributes to the reputation of the organization. Therefore, the reputation of an organi-
zation is necessarily dynamic and evolves with the performance of the members. The chapter
gures out the dynamics of its evolution in the social best equilibria.
While the organization is dealt with as a whole in Chapter One, Chapter Two and Chapter
Three consider how it is structured or framed as the stage for the members to interact. Chapter
Two considers the classic problem of the boundary of the rm, which is rst studied by Coase
(1937) and followed by a vast volume of literature. The chapter is, however, motivated by
the observation that the literature seldom takes into account control or coordination side but
overwhelmingly concentrates on incentive side. The chapter di¤erentiates control problems from
incentive problems. Both refer to situations where a principal wants an agent to make a preferable
choice among ex ante uncontracible alternatives. Control problems di¤er from incentive problems
in on-time negotiability. If on the time when the agent is deciding the choice the decision are
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negotiable (namely contractible) between the principal and the agent, it is a control problem,
and if not, an incentive problem. Take an example from Milgrom and Roberts (1992), where a
group of players are propelling a rowboat in a match. To have each player put his oar into the
water at the same time is a control problem; the action is observable, and contractible. But to
have him exert high e¤ort to pull his oar in the water is an incentive problem; he could look but
is actually not labored. For another example, it is a control problem to ensure G. W. Bush to
or not to invade Iraq, but it is an incentive problem to ensure him spend more time considering
serious stu¤ rather than having fun, as he claimed that he was working even in his Texas farm.
The model of the chapter consists of a principal (she), an agent (him) and a physical capital.
With the capital, the agent can carry out two exclusive projects, one leading to the product of
general interest and sold directly to the market, the other leading to the product specic to the
principals need but useless to others. Before the date of choosing the project to be done, the
agent chooses the level of human capital investment and after the date, he chooses the level of
e¤ort doing the chosen project. The project choice is decided through bargaining between the
principal and the agent and is thus control problem. In contrast, the choices of the levels of the
human capital investment and the e¤ort are privately decided by him, not subject to bargaining,
and are, therefore, incentive problems. To give the agent incentive to make the investment
and to exert the e¤ort, he should be given the payo¤ rights of the capital, namely he owns
what he produces. The chapter examines who should get ownership rights of the capital, which
mean, following Grossman & Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1990), residual control rights,
namely the rights to use the capital as he or she wishes when bargaining fails to reach any
agreement. Following them again, integration is dened as the arrangement where the principal
owns the capital and non-integration as the one where the agent owns it. The chapter shows
that integration induces too much control, that is, the specic project is chosen even when it
is not e¢ cient, and non-integration induces too little control, that is, the specic project is not
chosen even when it is e¢ cient.
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Under integration, the agent can be regarded as a division of a M-form organization: owner-
ship of physical capital is centralized in the hands of the principal, but the agent has the payo¤
rights of the division, owning what he produces. The chapter therefore points out a rationale for
M-form organizations, centralized ownership of physical capital to facilitate coordination, and
payo¤ rights remained to divisions to give them incentive.
The perspective of Chapter Two is in the line of GHM, holding that ownership structure of
physical capital delineates the border between the rm and the market. A new perspective is
presented in Chapter Three, where the border is decided by the allocation of the liability, which
is particularly relevant in considering the existence of nancial intermediations (FIs).
Why does the fund not go directly from the investors to the entrepreneurs sometimes, but
passed by nancial intermediaries, which obviously adds one more level of agency problems?
Could any di¤erence be made by the plain fact that the fund changes hands one more time?
A common sense, plausible, suggests that the intermediaries provide extra services, besides the
intermediation of fund ow. For instance, she could see the quality of assets better than the
investors and thus screen projects for them to invest; or she could observe the outcomes of the
invested projects and fence the investors o¤ being cheated of misreporting. This "extra-service"
point of view, however, does not hit the exact target; the intermediaries may indeed provide
valuable services, but the services could be provided separated from, rather than bound up with,
the intermediation of fund ow. In other words, the intermediaries could provide the services
only, with the fund owing directly between the investors and the entrepreneurs, rather than
both provide the services and intermediate between the two groups. To understand the existence
of FIs, it needs exactly to answer why the latter arrangement is better than the former, which
an extra-service point of view fails to understand.
If the valuable services are provided both under either arrangement, then how to dene FI
poses a challenge for the rst place. A straightforward answer is that it is by the way the funds
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ow. According to this Chapter, however, this is just the appearance, not the essence; what
matters is the allocation of the liability to the investors: if the provider of the services takes
the liability, then the arrangement is FI, whereas if the entrepreneurs take the liability by some
means, it is of direct nance. The way of fund ow is not more than a hallmark of the allocation
of the liability.
The Chapter considers the economics of the allocation of the liability in an economy of
Townsend (1979), where the output of an entrepreneur is veried to investors only through
costly auditing, but observed by an expert at minor costs. The expert can thus provide the
service of observing the outputs of entrepreneurs; the service is called monitoring, following Di-
amond (1984). Particularly, the chapter challenges the view that FI is driven by the benet of
diversication, a view rst established by Diamond (1984) and then well accepted in the liter-
ature following him. Basically, Diamond (1984) shows that under su¢ cient diversication, the
average costs of nancing an entrepreneur under FI, where the monitor becomes the bank, is
lower than those under Independent Finance (IF), where each entrepreneur is nanced indepen-
dently and separately, without monitoring provided. The chapter nds that the same benet
of diversication is implemented by an arrangement of direct nance, called Conglomeration.
Under Conglomeration, the liability is taken by the conglomerate consisting of the entrepreneurs
and the monitor, where each of entrepreneur-projects becomes a division and Ms X becomes the
headquarter monitoring them, advising them of the overall performance of the conglomerate and
of the contribution of each division to clear the overall liability of the conglomerate. Indeed, the
chapter nds that to implement the benet of diversication, what is needed is joint liability
and monitoring, which are provided under both FI and Conglomeration.
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Chapter One: The Reputation of an Organization and Its
Dynamics
I.0 Introduction of the Chapter
What is the value of a name? It stands for the past glories, and because of them, it stands for
the quality of the products (or services) currently provided under the name. However, often the
glories were created by members long gone, and have nothing to do with current production. How
can a name still stand for current quality in these cases? Moreover, organizational reputation is
tradeable through mergers & acquisitions or trademark transactions. Unknown rms can become
reputable by buying reputable names; for example, Tata acquires Jaguar and Lenovo acquires
the PC subsidiary of IBM to become well known in the western world. It seems, therefore, that
organizational reputation is backed by nothing intrinsic. On the other hand, it goes up after a
success and down after a failure, as if it is backed by some intrinsic type and the posterior of the
type being good is raised by success and lowered by failure. How do we explain these dynamics,
if there is actually no such a type?
Some could still argue that behind names stands something intrinsic, such as Coca Colas
secret recipe. This chapter, however, shows that such things are not necessary for names to
bear reputation. They can bear reputation in a way similar to how at money bears value.
Furthermore, names bearing reputation helps mitigate the lemons problem (Akerlof (1970))
thereby improving social e¢ ciency.
Consider an overlapping generation (OLG) economy. Young agents of each generation choose
whether or not to produce a widget. They enter production with a name, either a new name
formed at no cost or an existing name bought from a retiring agent; this name carries the history
of performances of the previous owners (including the agent). Only good type youths produce a
useful widget with a probability high enough to generate social surplus, and the production of
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bad types is a social waste. The type of a youth is his private information. If names of reputable
histories are believed to signal or sort out good types, all youths want these names. This belief
is rationalized, if good types outbid bad types in the competition for the names. This happens,
because of following two mechanisms.
The rst is the value-adding mechanism, which depends on the dynamics of name values.
Consider the case where the type is the only private information. Good type agents succeed in
producing a useful widget with a higher probability than bad ones. They outbid bad agents in
competing for reputable names if the resale value of the names is higher after a success than
after a failure. Therefore, the dynamics of name values decide how well names signal and sort
out good types. In this chapter more sorting leads to higher e¢ ciency. The rst best where only
good types produce is not achievable. The second best is implemented by a simple dynamics
that involves only two states, one for new names and the other for reputable names. In the
dynamics, a name is brought into the reputable state by a success and into the non-reputable
state by a failure, which explains the dynamics mentioned in the rst paragraph.
The second is the commitment mechanism. To illustrate it, another piece of private infor-
mation is added: each agent privately receives a noisy signal on the quality of his widget after
producing and before selling it. This post-production information cannot be transmitted through
the names, which were bought before the signals arrive. It is transmitted through the price of
widgets if agents are incentivized to price those widgets at the true value that they know are
useless. The incentive is driven by the belief that if the useless widget of a name is overpriced,
all the widgets subsequently produced under the name are also useless and overpriced. In other
words, a norm of setting honest prices is imposed upon names.1 Whenever a name overprices
a widget, it breaks the norm, is never trusted again, and thus loses its resale value. The norm
1In real life, organizations are indeed subject to moral judgements. For example, Financial Times reported
ten most ethically perceived brands in France, Germany, Spain, UK and US respectively (p. 24, Tuesday, Feb.,
20, 2007).
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forces an agent who sells a useless widget to choose between the names resale value and the
prot from setting a high dishonest price. Thus, buying names with high-enough resale values is
equivalent to committing to pricing widgets honestly. Only good types are willing to make the
commitment. They are thus sorted out by those names.
In the complete model, where agents have private information of both the type and the signal,
the second best dynamics vary with the social surplus generated by good types. The smaller the
surplus, the greater the number of successes new names need to accumulate to accomplish the
top reputation. The surplus can be proxied by the prot margin and good types by high end
rms. Then, the comparative statics predict an inverse relationship between the average prot
margin of high end rms of an industry and the time span for new rms of this industry to fully
establish reputation. For example, rms in the high-tech industry will build reputations more
quickly than rms in the wine-making industry.
This chapter is closely related to the literature on corporate names, starting with Kreps
(1990). In both papers, names refer to nothing intrinsic, and as a result, there exist babble
equilibria where names are devoid of reputation.2 In contrast, Tadelis (1999) o¤ers a model
where no babble equilibria exist, due to the assumption that change in name ownership is
unobservable to customers.3 This assumption, however, raises two issues. It backs names with
something intrinsic, namely the type of the last period owners; and it does not capture big
2This and the requirement of innite horizon to sustain a names reputation are the two problems criticized
by Tadelis (1999). Theoretically the rst one is well justied. In real life, however, many great creations of
human societies are driven by proper beliefs, such as at money, language (Crawford and Sobel (1982)), laws
and authority (Mailath, Morris and Postlewaite (2001)). The second one is not a problem even theoretically.
Names can physically live forever, which, this paper shows, is in fact the reason why having them bear reputation
improves social e¢ ciency.
3Following that paper, Tadelis (2002, 2003) incoporates moral hazard and Marvel and Ye (2008) analyze the
welfare properties of allowing names to be traded. The same assumption is made by Mailath and Samuelson
(2001).
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corporative names well, ownership change of which is usually exposed by the media and hardly
unobservable. Hakenes and Peitz (2007) and Deb (2008) establish that names can hold reputation
with observable ownership change. In Hakenes and Peitz (2007), the reputation of a name is
driven by neither the value-adding mechanism nor the commitment mechanism they actually
do not describe dynamics but by customers switching. In Deb (2008), the reputation is driven
by the value-adding mechanism; this mechanism is thus independently discovered by her paper
and this chapter.4 She describes some exogenously given dynamics, as Mailath and Samuelson
(2001) and Tadelis (2002, 2003), but the e¢ ciency of those dynamics is unclear. Compared to the
existing literature, this chapter makes three contributions. First, it discovers the commitment
mechanism. It is a surprise that the norm of setting honest prices makes a di¤erence in the
context of purely adverse selection of this chapter; in the literature, norms work in contexts
of moral hazard, such as Klein and La­ er (1981) and Shapiro (1983). Second, this chapter
derives the dynamics of organizational reputation in the second best equilibria. Third, it nds
the comparative statics result that relates the second best dynamics to economic fundamentals.
In this chapter, names are similar to at money in the way of bearing value (Samuelson (1958)
and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)). Moreover, a name is essentially a record-keeping device, as
is money by Kocherlakota (1998), although that paper uses a moral hazard framework, while
this chapter develops an adverse selection model. The parallel goes further in equilibria where
the value of a name depends only on the number of successes net of failures, not on the order of
their occurrences, as if a unit of money were given because of a success and extracted because
of a failure. Those equilibria, however, are not among the second best.
the chapter consists of two parts, the basic model and the complete model; the latter adds
to the former another piece of private information. The basic model is intended to highlight
4A previous version of this paper, Wang (2007), was presented in the Econometric Society North American
summer meeting at Duke University and then submitted for publication in that year. During the submission, I
learnt of Debs paper, which, following Tadelis (2002), involves both moral hazard and adverse selection.
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the value-adding mechanism and the complete model delivers the commitment mechanism and
the comparative statics. Subsection I.1 examines the basic model. Subsection I.2 examines the
complete model. Then subsection I.3 concludes. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
I.1 The Basic Model
The basic model is a special case of the complete model and is interesting in itself. First we lay
out the model.
I.1.1 The Model
The time is from  1 to +1; with period t starting at date t and ending at date t + 1. The
economy has two goods, corn (endowed good and numeraire) and widget (produced good). Each
period is populated with a mass 2 continuum of sellers and much more buyers. All agents are
risk neutral. Sellers live for two periods, so that in each period mass one sellers are young and
the other mass one old. The one-period discount rate for young sellers is r < 1. Only young
sellers are active. Each of them chooses to produce either one widget at cost c or nothing at all.
Old sellers are idle. Sellers consume no widgets but corn only. Buyers are endowed with corn
and consume both. How long they live does not matter since their only role is to compose the
long demand side of the widget market in each period. A widget is either useful or useless. A
useful widget is worth v for the buyer, while a useless one is worth v. Sellers are of two types,
good or bad. A good seller produces a useful widget with probability q and a bad one with
probability q < q: Without loss of generality, let v = 0 and v = v; q = 0 and q = q < 1: The
proportion of good sellers is  for each period.
Assumption 1: qv < c < qv:
Since c < qv, a good seller generates social surplus  =: qv   c > 0, whereas a bad seller
generates  c < 0. Therefore, social e¢ ciency is measured by the extent to which bad sellers
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are excluded from producing widgets. The question of how to exclude them becomes interesting
because of the following information structure.
A sellers type, good or bad, is his private information. The quality of a widget, useful or
useless, is not observable to the buyer when it is traded, but is revealed to all the agents of this
and the next generations at the end of the period by word of mouth.
Assumption 2: Although the quality becomes publicly known at the end of the period, it is
not contractible when the widget is traded.
This assumption implies that the price of a widget cannot be based on its quality. Otherwise,
if it is priced at its value, v or 0; bad sellers will never enter production and the question of how
to exclude them becomes trivial.5
Suppose that after knowing his type but before engaging in production, a young seller obtains
a name for his rm. He either forms a new name at no cost or buys an existing name from a
retiring seller. Then the trading of names becomes the only inter-period link of the economy.
All unsold names retire out of the economy with the owners. Because only young sellers hold
names, it is common knowledge that ownership of names changes each period.
Each period goes through the following stages in order.
1. Young sellers are born, privately know their types, and decide whether to produce a
widget.
2. The name market opens, where young sellers buy names from retiring sellers of the last
generation.
5The same assumption is made by Tadelis (1999, 2002, 2003). This assumption is in the spirit of the Holmstrom
(1999) career concern model, where at the end of a period a managers performance is perfectly observed by the
labor market, but at the beginning his wage contract cannot be based on it. The fundamental di¤erence is that
in Holmstrom (1999), the manager never dies and hence it is about personal reputation, whereas in this paper
each seller retires after one period and it is about organizational reputation.
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3. Widgets are produced, and sold in the widget market to buyers, who do not observe the
quality of the widgets
4. This period ends and the next starts. The quality of all the widgets is publicly revealed.
The name market opens again where this generations retiring sellers sell their names to newborn
young sellers.
If a seller buys his name at price p0; sells his widget at w; and resells the name at p1, then
his overall return is R =  p0 +w  c+ rp1; in which w  c is the prot from the widget market
and  p0+ rp1 is the capital gain from the name markets. The utility of a widget buyer is ev w,
where ev = v or 0, depending on its quality. The reservation value of sellers who do not produce
and of buyers who do not purchase are both 0.
A name could be used consecutively over several periods. The history of a name until date t
is dened as the sequence of the qualities of the widgets produced up to period t  1 under that
name. This history is publicly known in period t. A name is characterized by its history; trading
names is essentially trading histories. Let s denote success (a useful widget is produced),
ffailure (a useless widget is produced) and ha history. A name with history h is called
an h-name. h is either empty (for new names), denoted by , or a sequence consisting of s
and f , such as s, sf, sssfetc. Let snbe the abbreviation of n consecutive s, and
similarly for fn: Denote by Hn the set of all histories of length n. Then, H0 = fg; H1 = fs; fg;
and H2 = fs2; sf; fs; f 2g etc. And let H = S
n0
Hn = f; s; f; s2; sf; fs; f 2; :::g be the set of all
possible histories.
Names evolve with the performance of their owners. If an h-name is owned by a good seller,
then with probability q; he succeeds, which transforms it into an hs-name in the next period,
while with probability 1   q the failure transforms it into an hf -name. If an h-name is owned
by a bad seller, it will denitely become an hf -name.
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The equilibrium concept is competitive equilibrium, which consists of prices and decisions.
The prices of widgets are denoted by wht and the prices of names by pht, where subscript h
represents the histories of names and t the dates of trading. Only young sellers have decisions to
make. They rst decide whether to produce and then which names to buy. Let eBt; eGt 2 [0; 1]
denote the probability of a bad seller and a good seller entering production respectively and let
ht denote the proportion of good sellers among the owners of all h-names in period t. Let ht
denote the mass of h-names in the date t name market. The total value of the names in the
market, which is the transfer from generation t sellers to generation t  1, is Vt =
P
h2H
htpht.
Denition 1 fpht; wht; eBt; eGt; htgh;t constitutes a competitive equilibrium if and only if
(i): Given the prices fpht; whtgh;t, the optimal decisions of sellers at date t are summarized
by eBt; eGt; and ht:
(ii): Given the decisions feBt; eGt; htgh;t, pht clears the market of h-names at date t.
(iii): Given feBt; eGt; htgh;t, wht clears the market of the widgets of h-names at date t.
(iv) (No Ponzi): limt!1 rtVT+t = 0 for any T:
All the conditions but No Ponzi are self evident. For No Ponzi, let Rt be the total return
of generation t sellers and t their total prot from the widget market. Besides the prots,
they pays Vt in total to buy names and obtain Vt+1 in total from selling the names. Therefore,
Rt = t   Vt + rVt+1: Then, if and only if the No Ponzi holds, we haveX
t0
rtRT+t =
X
t0
rtT+t   VT (1)
The No Ponzi condition ensures that, taken as a whole all the sellers from generation T
onwards, their return must come from the "real values" they create in producing widgets. Thus
sellers cannot earn arbitrarily large resources by simply buying and reselling names. No Ponzi
condition is used here to prick asset bubbles, as in macroeconomics literature.
Only "stationary equilibria" are considered in this chapter, where pht; wht; eBt; eGt; and ht do
not depend on t, but on h only. In stationary Equilibria, names are classied into states; names
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in the same state have the same value and evolve into the same state after a success or a failure.
The dynamics of names are then Markovian transformations over the states. In principle, each
history could be a separate state, and there are innite of histories. What happens in equilibrium,
however, is much simpler, as will be shown. States are denoted by capitalized histories, such as
; S, and S2, which respectively denote the states containing new names, s-names, and s2-names.
Since new names are created at no cost, p = 0: Because buyers are on the long side of the
widget market, competition drives them to obtain their reservation value, 0, in any equilibrium;
this, in combination with them being risk neutral, implies that the market clearing price of a
widget equals the expected value:
wh = E(vjh) = qhv (2)
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium, bad sellers obtain 0 return.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, in some equilibrium bad sellers get positive return from production.
Then they all enter production in the equilibrium. The average price of the widgets, equal
the expected value, is thus qv; while the average cost is c. By Assumption 1, qv < c. No
Ponzi therefore implies that on average sellers obtain less than their reservation value, which is
impossible in any equilibrium.
As both buyers and bad sellers get 0 surplus, all social surplus goes to good sellers. Their
return, therefore, measures the social e¢ ciency.
Before we show how names bear reputation, we rst consider as a benchmark what happens
if names do not bear reputation, which sheds lights on why personal reputation is not su¢ cient
and why we need organizational reputation.
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I.1.2 Benchmark: the Babble Equilibria
Suppose names are not believed to convey any information about the type of the current sellers.
Then young sellers are not willing to pay for existing names, and the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 : In any equilibrium where names do not bear reputation, the social surplus is
0.
Proof. : In the equilibria where no widgets are produced, the social surplus is obviously 0.
For the equilibria where widgets are produced and traded, rst note that the following prole of
prices and decisions forms an equilibrium. ph = 0 and wh = c for all h; no sellers buy existing
names (as discussed above), and the two types of sellers enter production in such a proportion
that the expected value of the widgets is c: Given the prices, the return of both types of sellers is
w   c = 0: Thus they are indi¤erent in entry and any proportion is justiable. Given the entry
decisions, the price of widgets is c by (2). The price of all names is surely 0. Thus this is an
equilibrium.
No other prices are possible in the equilibria. Names price has to be 0. If the price of
widgets w < c; no sellers want to produce. If w > c, then all sellers, particularly the bad ones,
get positive return if entering production, which contradicts Lemma 1. Thus, w = c in all the
equilibria. Hence, the return of good sellers is always 0 and so is the social surplus.
In this benchmark, bad sellers enter production to the extent that all the social surplus
generated by good sellers is wholly dissipated. At the end of each period, a mass q of retiring
good sellers has succeeded and established personal reputations. However, in the next period
these people are retired and bring their personal reputations out of the economy. This explains
why such ine¢ ciency arises in the benchmark. Having names bear reputation improves e¢ ciency,
exactly because names can technically live forever, but persons cannot.
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The next subsection provides a complete characterization of equilibrium payo¤s and thus
shows what can be done by having names bear reputation.
I.1.3 The Characterization of Equilibrium E¢ ciency
A series of equilibria, ordered by  2 [ c
qv
; 1]; are constructed below. The e¢ ciency of the equilibria
increases with ; when  = 1; we arrive at the highest e¢ ciency, and when  = c
qv
; we go back
to the babble equilibria, the lowest e¢ ciency.
Two-State  Equilibrium (TSE-): In this equilibrium, names are of two states, 
and S; for new names and reputable names respectively. A -name becomes an S-name after a
success and remains a -name after a failure. An S-name remains an S-name after a success,
and degenerates into (or is replaced by) a -name after a failure. The dynamic is illustrated as
follows.
Figure 1: the Two-State Dynamics
The prices of names are p = 0 and pS = qv   c: The prices of widgets are wS = qv
and w = c: The decisions are summarized by S =  and  = cqv ; eG = 1 and eB =

1 
(1 q)(1 )+(1 )(q+1 )

:6
Lemma 2 The above prole of prices and decisions forms an equilibrium for any  2 [ c
qv
; 1].
Proof. Let us verify that conditions (i)-(iv) are satised. Obviously, condition (iii), equivalent
to (2), is satised, and so is No Ponzi (condition (iv)).
6To nd eB ; rst notice that in the steady state, the inow of state S equals the outow, that is, q =
S [(1 q)+1 ]: As all good sellers enter (eG = 1), and they own either -names or S-names,  = +s:
From these two equations, we nd  and S : Then the total mass of bad sellers entering production is (1 
) + s(1  ), which divided by 1   gives eB :
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For condition (i), check that both types of sellers are indi¤erent in buying either state of
names, and that good sellers get nonnegative return while bad sellers get 0. Hence any S; 
and eB are optimal, and the optimal eG = 1. If good sellers buy S-names, their return is
 pS + wS   c + r[qpS + (1  q)p] = rqpS: If they buy -names, the return is  p + w   c +
r[qpS + (1   q)p] = rqpS again, where pS = qv   c  0: Hence good sellers are indi¤erent
between buying - and S-names and prefer entering production. If bad sellers buy S-names, the
return is  pS + wS   c + rp = 0: If they buy -names, it is  p + w   c + rp = 0. Hence,
bad sellers are indi¤erent in buying any names, and in entry.
For condition (ii), given that good sellers buy both states of names on the equilibrium path,
they must be indi¤erent in buying either state of names at the market clearing price of S-names.
That is,  pS +wS   c+ rqpS = w  c+ rqpS ) pS = wS  w = qv  c, as specied above.
In TSE-; the return of good sellers, which measures e¢ ciency, is rq(qv   c): It increases
continuously with : Measured by the number of the states of names, the TSE are the simplest
after the babble equilibria; the former involves two states,  and S; while the latter involves
only one. By Proposition 1, the latter implements the lowest social e¢ ciency. Therefore, it
is surprising that, with only one more state added, the TSE already implement all levels of
equilibrium e¢ ciency with  2 [ c
qv
; 1]. The following lemma helps prove this assertion.
Lemma 3 ph  1 r for any h in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Intuitively, if some h-names are sold at a price higher than 
1 r ; for sellers to buy these names,
the sum of the namesresale values (qhphs + (1   qh)phf) must be even higher. The same
consideration holds true for those names that evolve from the h-names (namely, hs; hf; hs2; hsf
etc.), which pushes the sum total of the values of these subsequently evolved names higher and
higher, and in the end breaks No Ponzi condition.
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The main proposition of the basic model is stated here.
Proposition 2 The surplus of TSE-1, rq; is the maximum social surplus among all equilibria.
Therefore, the series of TSE- implement all levels of equilibrium e¢ ciency with  2 [ c
qv
; 1].
Proof. Given any equilibrium, we are going to show that the equilibrium return of good sellers
is not greater than rq. For the equilibrium, P = supfphjh 2 Hg is well dened by lemma 3. For
any " such that 0 < " < c; there exist h-names such that ph > P ": First, not all h-names are
bought by bad sellers in equilibrium. Otherwise, the names sort out useless widgets, and wh = 0:
Buying the names, bad sellers obtain ph+wh c+rphf   ph c+rP <  P+ c+rP < 0:
Thus they should not buy the names, a contradiction.
Thus h-names are bought by good sellers on the equilibrium path. The return of good sellers
buying the names is  ph+wh c+r[qphs+(1 q)phf ]   ph+wh c+r[qP +(1 q)phf ] =
rq(wh   c) + rq(P   ph) + (1   q)( ph + wh   c + rphf ) + q(1   r)( ph + wh   c): Let
us check the last sum term by term. For the rst two terms, wh   c = hqv   c   by (2),
and P   ph < ": As to the third and the fourth terms, consider what bad sellers get if they
buy h-names. Their return is  ph + wh   c+ rphf ; which is nonpositive. It follows that the
fourth term  ph +wh   c   rphf  0: Therefore, the return of good sellers buying h-names
is no bigger than rq+ rq": This return is the equilibrium return of good sellers, since they buy
h-names on the equilibrium path. The equilibrium return is thus no bigger than rq + rq"; for
any " such that 0 < " < c: The proposition is proved by making " go to 0.
For an intuition, consider the extreme case where r = 1 and some h-names actually take the
top value P . The return of good sellers buying these names consists of the prot, wh c; and the
capital gain. As the h-names take the top value, the sellers obtain no capital gain from success.
However, when they fail, the capital loss must be no less than the prot; otherwise, bad sellers
earn positive return by buying the h-names. Therefore, at least 1   q of the prots are o¤set
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by the expected capital loss and the return is thus no more than q(wh   c) = q(hqv   c) 
q(qv   c) = q:
By Proposition 2, we know the rst best is not achievable: in the rst best, only good sellers
produce and hence the social surplus is  > rq. Therefore names function as only an imperfect
substitute for the contracts that would implement the rst best when the quality of widgets is
veriable.
There are equilibrium dynamics that involve more than two states. An example is given in
Appendix A, which involves four states. It implements the second best e¢ ciency, however, if
and only if it degenerates to the two-state dynamics above, that is, among the four states, two
of them are equivalent and so are the other two.
Here we end the examination of the basic model. The next section considers the complete
model that adds one element to the basic model, the post production signal. The basic model is
thus a special case of the complete model where the signal is not informative at all. The complete
model delivers two points that the basic model fails to deliver. It shows that organizational
reputation can arise through a norm of setting honest prices for widgets. Also, it shows that in
the second best equilibria, the smaller is , the greater is the number of successes a name needs
to accumulate in order to accomplish the top reputation. In contrast, in the basic model only
one success is needed to accomplish the top reputation, independent of .
I.2 The Complete Model
Subsection 3.1 rst presents the new element, the post-production signal. To utilize this ex-
tra information, the norm of honestly pricing widgets is introduced. This norm drives a new
mechanism to sort out good types, the commitment mechanism.
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I.2.1 The Signal, the Norm, and the Commitment Mechanism
In the basic model, a seller has only private information of his type. In the complete model,
besides the type, he privately receives a signal about the quality of his widget when it has been
produced. The signal, denoted by em; is either "n" ("nice") or "u" ("useless"), according to the
following conditional distribution:
Pr(em = njev = v) = 1; Pr(em = njev = 0) = 1   and Pr(em = ujev = 0) =  < 1:
 measures the informativeness of the signal. If  = 0; it is completely uninformative and we
go back to the basic model. If  = 1; the seller knows precisely the quality of the widget, and
there is no interesting stationary Markovian dynamics (see footnote 14). So  < 1 is assumed.
The timing is the same as in the basic model, except that at stage 3 (see page 7), after the
widgets are produced and before they are sold, sellers receive the signals.
An additional assumption is introduced.
Assumption 3: 1 r
(1 rq)rq <
qv c
qv
:
The assumption complements Assumption 1 and says that the discount rate, r; is close to 1
enough. Its signicance will be clear when Proposition 3 is proved in Subsection 3.2.
The Norm of Setting Honest Prices:
In order for the signals to make a di¤erence, it is necessary to impose upon names a norm of
setting honest prices for the widgets. The information of the signals is not transmitted by the
names, which were bought before the signals arrive. If this information is to be utilized at all, it
must be transmitted through the prices of the widgets. In particular, sellers must be incentivized
to set price 0 for those widgets that they know are useless, even though they would like to sell
at a higher price. After selling the widgets, sellers care only for the resale value of their names.
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The incentive, therefore, must consist in the benet of setting price 0 on the resale value. The
benet comes as follows.
Suppose buyers believe that a name that ever set a positive price for a useless widget keeps
producing useless widgets and overpricing them. Then, no seller would want this name and
the names resale value would be destroyed. That is, names are subject to a norm of setting
honest prices. Whenever a name sets a positive price for a useless widget, it breaks the norm,
is regarded as dishonest, and is not trusted any more. This name then becomes useless and is
destroyed. The norm will improve e¢ ciency in this setting of purely adverse selection.
In this economy, it is not socially e¢ cient to impose the norm upon all names and thus
destroy any names that break the norm. If the resale value of a name is lower than the gain
from setting a dishonest price, the threat of losing the value does not deter the seller from
cheating. Imposing the norm in such a situation merely destroys the name, a resource of the
economy, without helping transmit the signals information. By this argument, in the socially
best equilibria, we destroy because of dishonesty only those names for which the resale value is
larger than the highest gain from cheating. This gain equals the highest widget price that buyers
will ever accept: w  E(evjG; em = n) = qv
q+(1 q)(1 ) ; where G represents the condition that the
widget is produced by a good seller. The present resale value of an h-name after producing a
useless widget is rphf : Therefore, the norm is imposed upon only such h-names that phf  wr :
The Commitment Mechanism
In the basic model, organizational reputation is driven by the value-adding mechanism: good
sellers succeed with a higher probability than bad ones; they outbid the latter for reputable
names, because they can add value to the names with success. The norm introduces another
sorting mechanism. Because of the norm, buying names of resale values phf  wr is equivalent
to committing ex ante to pricing the widgets honestly. These names thus sort out good sellers,
because only good sellers are willing to make the commitment, whereas bad sellers are not. This
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mechanism is called the commitment mechanism. Accordingly, names such that phf  wr are
"commitment names", and names such that phf < wr are "non-commitment names". The price
of a non-commitment names widget depends only on the names history, as by (2), not on the
post-production signal. In contrast, the price of a commitment names widget depends both on
the history and the post-production signal. The resale price of a commitment name, after a
failure, is either phf or 0 (the name being destroyed), contingent on the price of the widget.
The belief as to the pricing behavior drives the norm, which drives the commitment mecha-
nism. The norm, however, makes a di¤erence only if the post production signal is informative
enough; therefore, that belief would make no di¤erence in the basic model even if it were intro-
duced there. This is proved in the next subsection. To prove it, we spell out rst the constraints
to which the dynamics of name values are subject in equilibrium. These constraints also help us
study the equilibria with the highest e¢ ciency.
I.2.2 The Dynamics and the Necessity of Post-Production Information
In any equilibrium, the dynamics of name values is decided by No Ponzi condition and following
two incentive compatibility constraints. (E1) good sellers obtain the same return RG  0 from
any names they buy on the equilibrium path; and (E2) bad sellers obtain 0 return on the
equilibrium path and non-positive return o¤ it. (E2) is proved in Lemma 1, which only depends
on Assumption 1 and No Ponzi condition, and thus holds true in the complete model.
First, for both commitment names and non-commitment names,
phf  ph + c
r
(3)
Otherwise, (E2) is violated; bad sellers would obtain a positive return,  ph  c+rphf ; by buying
h-names and setting wh = 0; which keeps the resale value, phf ; in any case.
Then, we consider two types of names case by case. Consider non-commitment names rst.
If h-names are only bought by bad sellers, they become a sign of useless widgets. Thus wh = 0
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and the bad sellers obtain  ph   c+ rphf ; which equals 0 by (E2). That is,
phf =
ph + c
r
(4)
If good sellers buy h-names, they obtainRG =  ph+wh c+r(qphs+(1 q)phf ) = ( ph+wh 
c+rphf )+rq(phs phf ). Two subcases arise. If ph++rphf > 0; bad sellers also buy the h-names
in equilibrium.7 By (E2),  ph+wh c+rphf = 0: Thus RG = rq(phs phf ). If  ph++rphf  0;
then h = 1; which implies wh = qv:8 Consequently, RG =  (ph    rphf ) + rq(phs  phf ): Let
h  maxfph      rphf ; 0g: Then the two subcases are summarized altogether into
RG = rq(phs   phf ) h (5)
Consider the case of h-names being commitment names. If bad sellers buy them, they
honestly set price 0 for the widgets and (4) follows. Consider a good seller who buys such an
h-name. With probability (1   q) ; he receives signal u, knows the uselessness of his widget,
and accordingly sets price 0, to keep the resale value, phf . With probability q + (1  q)(1  );
he receives signal n and sets price w = E(evjG; em = n) with probability 1.9 However, with
probability Pr(ev = 0jG; n) = (1 q)(1 )
q+(1 q)(1 ) his widget is actually useless and hence price w is
regarded as dishonesty, which leads the name to be destroyed; with probability q
q+(1 q)(1 ) , the
widget is indeed useful and the name is resold at price phs: Therefore, RG =  ph   c + (1  
7Otherwise, suppose no bad sellers buy the names. Then wh = qv; by (2) (for non-commitment names).
Therefore, if buying the names, bad sellers would obtain  ph+wh c+rphf =  ph++rphf > 0; contradictory
to (E2).
8Otherwise, suppose h < 1 and thus wh < qv. Then, if buying the names, bad sellers obtain  ph +wh   c+
rphf <  ph +  + rphf  0; and hence they should not buy them, contradictory to the supposition that h < 1.
9Suppose otherwise, concerned about keeping the resale value, he sets price 0 with some probability  > 0.
Then conditional on price 0 and the h-names, the expected value of the widgets is positive: E(evjh;w = 0) _
  w > 0: In equilibrium the price of these widgets equals the expected value and hence is positive, which
contradicts the supposition that the price is 0.
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q) [0 + rphf ] + [q + (1  q)(1  )][w + qq+(1 q)(1 )rphs]; which is simplied as
RG =  ph +  + rqphs + r(1  q)phf (6)
An equilibrium dynamics of name values is a function p : H  ! R+ [ 0; where H is the set
of all possible histories, such that
(a): for new name, p = 0; and for any names, (3);
(b): for non-commitment names, (4) if h-names are bought by bad sellers only and (5)
otherwise;
(c): for commitment names, (4) if h-names are bought by bad sellers ever and (6) if they are
bought by good sellers;
(d): No Ponzi.
As in the basic model, No Ponzi implies that ph < 1 r by Lemma 3, the proof of which
depends only on the two equilibrium conditions (E1) and (E2), not on any specic dynamic
equations, and thus holds true in the complete model. Therefore, P = supfphjh 2 Hg is well
dened for any given equilibrium.
Lemma 4 (commitment mechanism) If h-names are commitment names and ph > rP   c; then
h-names sort out good sellers.
Proof. If bad sellers ever buy the names, by (c), phf = ph+cr > P; contradictory to the denition
of P .
By the lemma, it seems that only the commitment names within the top range sort out good
sellers through commitment mechanism. However, Subsection 3.3 will show that in the equilibria
with the highest e¢ ciency, there are no other commitment names. Therefore, all commitment
names sort out good sellers in these equilibria.
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Any dynamics fphgh2H that satises (a), (b), (c) and (d) above can be embedded into an
equilibrium10. Hereinafter, we only consider the dynamics without fully spelling equilibria, unless
necessary. The problem of nding the socially best equilibria is, then, to construct an equilibrium
dynamics that bears the largest RG: That is,
Problem 1 maxfphgh2H RG; s.t. (a), (b), (c), and (d).
To obtain a lower bound of the maximum value, notice that any equilibrium of the basic
model that involves only non-commitment names is also an equilibrium in the complete model,
since non-commitment names satisfy the same constraints in both models. In particular, TSE-1,
which implements RG = rq; is an equilibrium in the complete model. Therefore, the maximum
is no smaller than rq; which Proposition 2 states is the highest e¢ ciency implemented in the
basic model. We are looking for equilibria that implement RG > rq; that is, that strictly
improve over the basic model. These equilibria are called "Norm Equilibria", since it is the
norm that makes them possible.
In Norm Equilibria, P  w
r
; otherwise, there are no commitment names and the norm has no
bite; moreover, the value of non-commitment names strictly increases with success.11 That is,
phs > ph (7)
We are going to prove that Norm Equilibria exist if and only if the post production signal is
informative enough. For that purpose, we establish an inequality that relates P to RG:
Lemma 5 In a Norm Equilibrium, P   RG
1 rq r(1 q) :
10Actually this equilibrium is almost unique. Given fphgh2H ; for non-commitment names, wh = ph   rphf + c
if ph   rphf < ; and qv otherwise, and h = whqv . For commitment names, wh = 0 or w; h = 1 if phf < ph+cr ;
but undecided if phf =
ph+c
r . eB =
1
1 
P
h h(1  h); and eG = 1
P
h hh, where h; the steady state mass of
h-names, is decided by the dynamics.
11By (5), phs = phf+RGrq +
maxfph  rphf ;0g
rq : In Norm Equilibria,
RG
rq >  by denition. Thus, phs  RGrq > ph if
ph  : For ph > ; notice that phf+maxfph  rphf ;0grq is minimized at phf = ph r : Thus phs > ph + RGrq > ph.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
For an intuition, consider the case where P = ph for some names and r = 1. These names are
commitment names; otherwise, phs > P by (7), a contradiction. Good sellers buying the names
obtain the full surplus they create, , since the names sort out good types through commitment
mechanism. On the other hand, since the names are of the top value, they obtain no capital gain
in any case; but they lose the namesvalue with probability (1   q)(1   ); when they receive
signal "n" for the useless widgets and unintentionally overprice them. Therefore, the return
RG     (1  q)(1  )P: The intuition also helps us nd the socially best equilibria.
The lemma paves the way to show the necessary and su¢ cient condition for Norm Equilibria
to exist.
Proposition 3 Norm Equilibria exist if and only if  >  c  (qv r)(1 rq)r(1 q)[qv (1 rq)] : Therefore, the
post-production information is necessary for the norm to make a di¤erence.
Proof. The necessary part is proved here. By denition, rq < RG in Norm Equilibria. Then
P <  rq
1 rq r(1 q) by Lemma 5. On the other hand, we saw P  wr : Therefore, Norm Equilibria
exist only if w
r
<  rq
1 rq r(1 q) ,  >  c: The proof of the su¢ ciency is relegated in Appendix B.
Intuitively, the norm is introduced only to utilize the post-production information. Imposing
the norm, however, incurs costs. With probability (1 q)(1 ); the top range commitment names
are destroyed, which is a social cost, because the good sellers who own the names unintentionally
overprice the useless widgets. This cost is proportional to 1   ; while the amount of the post-
production information is measured by  : Therefore, imposing the norm brings about a net gain
only if  is beyond a threshold,  c.  c < 1 by Assumption 3.
By Lemma 5, RG < : Therefore, the rst best where RG =  is not implementable in the
complete model either. Subsequently, we proceed to examine the second best equilibria for the
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case where  >  c; as by Proposition 3, if    c; the second best is the same as in the basic
model. The ultimate objective is to show that with  decreasing, the dynamics that implement
the second best become more and more complex, according to some measurement of complexity
presented in the next subsection.
Hereinafter, to ease notations, we let   (1   q)(1   ); the probability of good sellers
unintentionally overpricing the widgets, and let r = 112.
I.2.3 The Simplest Second Best Dynamics
After presenting the measurement of complexity, the subsection proceeds to reformulate Problem
1, which leads to a renement of equilibria. The subsection then spells out two cases of simplest
dynamics.
The complexity of a dynamics is measured by its length, denoted by l, which is dened as
follows. If the minimum upper bound P is never reached by any h-names, which means name
values never stop growing, then dene l = 1: If some h-names take the top value P , then the
length of the dynamics is dened as the smallest number of periods over which new names can
reach the top position.13 That is,
Denition 2 The length of a dynamic is l = minfnj ph = P for some h 2 Hng; if the set is
not empty; otherwise l = 1: Moreover, if l < 1; h 2 H l such that ph = P are called the rst
top names.
The length of the TSE of the basic model is 1. The improvement in e¢ ciency comes with
increase in complexity, as follows.
12More precisely, it is the case of r close to but still less than 1. As everything below is continuous in r, we
only consider what happens at r = 1:
13Norm Equilibria involve new names. As shown in the proof of Lemma 5, the top range names are commitment
names and are bought by good sellers only. They are destroyed into new names with probability .
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Lemma 6 For the dynamics of any Norm Equilibrium, l  2:
Proof. It su¢ ces to prove that ph < w for any h 2 f; s; fg; since w  P: p = 0 < w: Apply
(3) to h = ; pf  c < qv < w: Apply (5) to  and rearrange, ps = pf + RGq  c+ RGq : By Lemma
5, RG    P    w =  + qw  ( + q)w =  + qw  qv = qw  c < q(w  c): Therefore,
ps  c+ RGq < w:
The clue on how to nd the second best dynamics is hinted in the intuition of Lemma 5.
Start with examining the top names. Suppose h-names take the top value P  w: We saw that
these names are commitment names and that they sort out good sellers through the commitment
mechanism (Lemma 4). Apply (6) to the names, RG =  P ++qphs+(1 q)phf : To maximize
RG; we want to maximize phs and phf . Therefore, phs = phf = P: That is, in the second best,
the top namesvalue stops varying with performance: phs = phf = P , so long as the norm of
setting honest prices is followed; it is destroyed only by unintended dishonesty (occurring with
probability ):14 Substitute ph = phs = phf = P into (6), then, in the second best,
RG =  P +  (8)
Since RG is inversely related to P; Problem 1 becomes
Problem 2 minfphgh2H P; s.t. (a), (b), (c), and P  w:
The constraint that P  w ensures that there are commitment names. To solve the problem,
we want the values of commitment names to be as small as possible, subject to the existence
of such names. Therefore, the only commitment names are the top names in the second best
equilibria; otherwise the top level commitment names could be cut o¤, which leaves some com-
mitment names and lowers P: It follows that all commitment names sort out good sellers in the
second best.
14It follows that if  = 1 and hence  = 0; the state of the top names will become an absorber of the dynamics.
Then, there are no stationary Markovian Equilibria. That is why  < 1 is needed.
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Ideally, P = w: This could be implemented by some "strange" dynamics in which failure
bears opposite meaning to names. To eliminate the equilibria with such dynamics, hereinafter,
the following renement is imposed.
Renement: phf  ph; for any h:
The renement ensures that failure damages names always. An example of the "strange"
equilibria is as follows. Suppose c = w
2
: Only bad sellers own new names. The names become
f -names one period later with pf = c by (4). These f -names are again owned by bad sellers
only and become f 2-names after one period with pf2 = 2c = w. These f 2-names are the rst
top names and owned by good sellers only. So P = w. In this dynamics, only bad sellers own
f -names, but only good sellers own f 2-names. That is, one failure stands for being totally bad,
but two consecutive failures stand for being perfectly good. This U-turn poses a great di¢ culty
to buyers in adjusting their belief as to the meaning of failure. This dynamics is eliminated by
the renement.
By the renement, phf  ph < ph + c. Therefore, (3) is automatically satised, and (4)
does not hold, which means that no non-commitment names are only bought by bad sellers and
that no commitment names are ever bought by bad sellers. Constraint (a) becomes p = 0:
Constraint (b), for non-commitment names, become
phs = phf + ps +
maxfph      phf ; 0g
q
(9)
Here we apply RG = qps; derived by substituting pf = 0 into (5) for h = : Substitute RG = qps
into (8), and constraint (c), for commitment names and thus the top names, become
qps =  P +  (10)
Incorporate the renement and the above simplication of the constraints into Problem 2,
and the problem becomes
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Problem 3 minfphgh2H P; s.t. p = 0; (9) if ph < P ; (10); phf  ph; and P  w:
By studying Problem 3, we proceed to construct two examples of the simplest second best
dynamics in particular and then to prove the comparative statics on the second best dynamics
in general.
By Lemma 6, the simplest Norm Equilibrium dynamics are of l = 2: Therefore, dynamics
that are of l = 2 and implement the second best are among the simplest second best dynamics.
Two cases of them are given in the following.
Lemma 7 If   q+2
2 q w, for Problem 3, the constraint P  w is not binding and the solution
dynamics are of l = 2, illustrated by gures 2 when  2 q
3 q or by gure 3 otherwise below. In
the dynamics, phs  ph  phf for any h and phf = 0 for ph  . Good sellers are sorted out by
S-names through value-adding mechanism and S2-names through commitment mechanism. Bad
sellers enter only through new names and SF -names.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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Figure 2: the second Best Dynamics if   2 q
3 q
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Figure 3: the second Best Dynamics if >2 q
3 q
Both dynamics involve four states, ; SF , S, and S2, and 0 = p < pSF < pS < pS2 = P:
S2-names are the only commitment names, they remain S2-names after a success or a failure,
so long as they follow the norm of setting honest prices; otherwise, they are destroyed into new
names (-names). Names of other three states are non-commitment names. After a success,
-names become S-names and S-names becomes S2-names. After a failure, -names remain -
names and S-names become SF -names. The evolution of SF -names gives the di¤erence between
the two dynamics. When  2 q
3 q ; they become S-names after a success and -names after a
failure. When  >2 q
3 q ; SF -names become S
2-names after a success and remain SF -names after
a failure.
Lemma 7 summarizes what happens when  is high enough. The next subsection shows that
with  smaller and smaller, the second best dynamics become longer and longer.
I.2.4 Comparative Statics of l with respect to 
To prove the comparative statics result, consider the condition under which some dynamics of
l = N could be a solution of Problem 3. Since phs > ph  phf , the rst top names are sN -names
if l = N . Consider then the maximum value of psN among all the dynamics of l = N: If this
value is smaller than w; then no dynamics of length N could be a solution of Problem 3, because
of no way to satisfy the constraint P  w:
psN is maximized if and only if psn+1   psn is maximized for each n = 1; 2:::N   1: For these
n; sn-names are non-commitment names as they are not in HN and l = N: Apply (9) to these
names, psn+1 = psnf + ps+
maxfpsn  psnf ;0g
q
: Given psn ; psn+1 is maximized by making psnf equal
0 or psn (by the renement, psnf  psn): Therefore, to maximize psN ;
psn+1 = max(psn ;
psn   
q
) + ps, for n = 1; 2:::N   1 (11)
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And as before, since psN = P; by (10),
 psN +  = qps (12)
Out of these N equations, we solve ps; ps2 ; :::; and particularly, psN = P: This P depends on
 and N; and we denote it by P (;N): P (;N) gives the maximum value of P among all the
dynamics of l = N: Only if P (;N)  w; there are dynamics of l = N that could be solutions of
Problem 3. P (;N) = w denes an implicit function N(): On the two functions, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 8 @P
@N
> 0 and N 0() < 0:
Proof. See Appendix C.
By the lemma above, for any given ; P (;N)  w if and only if N  N(): That is,
N() is the minimum length of the dynamics that can be solutions of Problem 3 at the given
: Moreover, the lemma says that the minimum length decreases with : In combination, the
lemma leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The smaller is ; the longer is the second best dynamics, and hence the greater
is the number of successes new names have to accumulate to accomplish the top reputation.
Intuitively, the value of a name increases with successes at a speed proportional to : the
increment in the value gives good sellers capital gain, which is proportional to the overall return;
the return in itself is proportional to : On the other hand, the threshold of the name value
over which names accomplish the top reputation is xed at p = w: Therefore, the smaller  is,
the more successes new names have to accumulate to cross the threshold, and the longer the
dynamics are.  = qv   c is the surplus generated by a good seller. Empirically, the surplus
could be proxied by the prot margin and good sellers proxied by high-end rms of an industry.
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Then, the proposition lays down an inverse relationship between the average prot margin of
high-end rms of an industry and the time span for new rms to fully establish reputation in
this industry. If we believe that the high-end rms in the software industry averagely earn a
higher prot margin than those in the wine industry, the comparative statics are consistent with
the observation that it took a decade for Microsoft to build up its reputation, while it took a
century for a wine rm to achieve some commensurate fame.
I.3 Conclusion of Chapter One
This chapter presents an OLG model where names stand for nothing intrinsic. Names can still
bear reputation, in the sense that past glories of a name stand for the quality of the product
currently provided under the name, in the following way. If that is believed, all sellers want names
with glorious past; this belief is rationalized if good types outbid bad types in the competition
for these names. This happens by two mechanisms. One is the value-adding mechanism: good
types are more capable of adding value to the names than the bad types, because they are more
likely to succeed in producing high quality products. The other is the commitment mechanism.
Highly reputable names are subject to the norm of pricing the products honestly. If the price is
found beyond the true value, the names lose all the reputation. On the other hand, even when
these names fail to produce high quality products, their reputation is not damaged by the failure
if they honestly set the low price for the products. Buying these names are equivalent to commit
to pricing the products honestly. Only good sellers are willing to make the commitment and
thus sorted out by these names. It is a surprise that the norm of setting honest prices makes a
di¤erence in the context of purely adverse selection of the chapter.
the chapter spells out some cases of the dynamics of organizational reputation in the equilibria
with the highest e¢ ciency. The dynamics are Markovian transformation over several states, each
dened by the value of the names of the state. The names of the top state sort out good sellers
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through the commit mechanism. They keep the reputation untouched, if and only if they follow
the norm. The names of other states signal and sort good types through the value-adding
mechanism. Their reputation increases after a success, decreases after a failure, and is totally
destroyed by a failure when the reputation is already low enough.
Lastly, the chapters nds that in the equilibria with the highest e¢ ciency, the smaller the
surplus generated by the good type agents, the longer the dynamics, that is, the greater the
number of successes which new names have to accumulate to accomplish the top reputation. This
comparative statics result predicts an inverse relationship between the average prot margin of
high-end rms of an industry and the time span over which rms can fully establish reputation
in the industry.
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Chapter Two: Control versus Incentive the Optimal Al-
location of Physical Capital Ownership
II.0 Introduction of the Chapter
Since Coase (1937) initiated the inquiry into the border between the rm and the market, it
has motivated vast literature under the name "the theory of the rm". the chapter is motivated
by the observation that this literature seldom takes into account control-coordination side but
overwhelmingly concentrates on incentive side. However, in a widely-covered study into the
industrial history of the US, Chandler (1977) nds that the giant corporations came into being
only when transactions were better coordinated within the rm than in the market and that to
the end of better coordination, it is necessary to put vast amounts of assets under centralized
ownership. the chapter presents a theory on how centralized ownership of physical capital benets
coordination through enhancing control over human capital and on how this benet is balanced
by concomitant cost in incentive loss.
the chapter di¤erentiates control problems from incentive problems. Both refer to situations
where a principal wants an agent to make a preferable choice among ex ante uncontracible
alternatives. Control problems di¤er from incentive problems in on-time negotiability. If on
the time when the agent is deciding the choice the decision are negotiable (namely contractible)
between the principal and the agent, it is a control problem, and if not, an incentive problem.
Take an example from Milgrom and Roberts (1992), where a group of players are propelling a
rowboat in a match. To have each player put his oar into the water at the same time is a control
problem; the action is observable, and contractible. But to have him exert high e¤ort to pull his
oar in the water is an incentive problem; he could look but not actually be labored. For another
example, it is a control problem to ensure G. W. Bush to or not to invade Iraq, but it is an
incentive problem to ensure him spend more time considering serious stu¤ rather than having
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fun, as he claimed that he was walking even in his Texas farm.
The model of the chapter consists of a principal (she), an agent (him) and a physical capital.
With the capital, the agent can carry out one of the two projects, on leading to the product
of general interest and sold directly to the market, the other leading to the product specic
to the principals need but useless to others. The full details of either project are not clear
before a particular date, and when the day arrives, she and he bargain on which project to be
done; the two parties have equal bargaining power, in the sense that each has one half chance to
make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er (tioli) to the other. The project to be done is thus contractible
at the date when it is decided. Before the date, the agent chooses the level of human capital
investment, preparing for the future project. After the date, he chooses the level of e¤ort doing
the chosen project. Both choices are privately decided by him, not subject to bargaining. The
value of both products increases with either incentive variable, but given the two incentive
variables, the specic product is worth more than the general one, and the excess is the benet
of coordination. So the choices of human capital investment and e¤ort are incentive problems;
to ensure the specic project to be chosen is a control problem.
The last ingredient of the model is the friction of bargaining, without which the project choice
follows ex post e¢ ciency, independent of who owns the capital. In the chapter, the friction is
due to information asymmetry at the contingencies. Under each contingency, the value of the
general project is a xed fraction of the specic projects value, across all levels of the incentive
variables. At the date when the two parties negotiate on the project to be done, the agent knows
the value of the fraction and the principal only knows its distribution.
The basic message of the chapter is that having the principal own the capital advantages
control but disadvantages incentive. First, there is the trade-o¤ between control and incentive.
The agent obtains the full value of the general product, which is sold to the competitive market.
On the contrary, the agent only reap half of the value of the specic product, as in Grossman
and Hart (1986), because of the hold up problem. Therefore, the better the control, the higher
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the chance the specic project is chose, the worse the incentive. Since the specic project entails
incentive loss, it is not always the second best, though given the levels of the incentive variables,
it is worth more than the general project.
Then, move on to consider the e¤ect of the allocation of ownership of the capital on the
project choice, which is decided through bargaining between the principal and the agent. When
the agent o¤ers a tioli to the principal, which happens with probability one half, there is no
e¢ ciency loss, since the principal has no private information. The di¤erence presents itself when
she o¤ers tioli.
First examine the arrangement where the principal owns the capital. The default choice is
the specic project. If the agent nevertheless wants to go for the general project, he has to
bargain with the principal, on the price to buy her assent. On the default option, she obtains
half of the general projects value. Therefore, it is dominated for her to ask for any price no
bigger than that half value, when she o¤ers tioli. The agent accepts her asked price, so the
general project is chosen, only if the value of the general project is no less than the sum of
the price plus his default option value, half of the specic projects value. We saw the price is
beyond the half of the specic projects value by a positive di¤erence. Therefore, the general
project is chosen only if its value is beyond the specics by more than this di¤erence. It follows
that under those contingencies where the general project is worth more than the specic but by
a smaller remainder than the di¤erence, the general project is socially e¢ cient but not chosen.
That is, having the principal own the capital induces too much control.
Then examine the arrangement where the agent owns the capital. Now the default choice is
the general project. If the principal wants him to work for her, to do the specic project, she
has to bargain with him, on the price to buy his assent. On success, she will get half of the
specic projects value. When o¤ering tioli, therefore, she o¤ers a price below the half value by
a positive di¤erence. If accepting the o¤er, the agent obtains the price plus half of the specic
projects value, which altogether equal the specic projects value minus the positive di¤erence.
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The o¤er is accepted, so the specic project is chosen, therefore, only if the general projects
value is below the specic projects by the di¤erence. It follows that under those contingencies
where the specic project is worth more than the general but by a smaller remainder than the
di¤erence, it is socially e¢ cient but not chosen. That is, having the agent own the capital induces
too little control.
Overall, the trade-o¤ between too much control versus too little control decides who owns
the capital in equilibrium. the chapter shows that the principal owns the capital if and only if
the benet of coordination is bigger enough.
The literature on the theory of the rm touches the control side only lightly. Given the volume
of the literature, the chapter apologizes for not providing a complete survey but mainly relying
on Gibbons (2004), who classies the literature into four categories which are addressed below
in order. The property rights theory (Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
(GHM hereinafter)) is concerned with suboptimal provision of some investments. The levels of
the investments, though observable after having sunk, are not decided by bargaining when the
investments are being laid down; otherwise, the hold-up problems evaporate. This category of
the literature, therefore, address only the incentive side, not the control side, even though Hart &
Moore (1990) uses word "control". The incentive theory (Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991, 1994)) is
concerned with the balance of the e¤ort between multiple tasks. Similarly, the quasi-rent seeking
theory (Baker & Hubbard (2000) etc.) is concerned with the e¤ects of ownership of physical
capital on the balance of the e¤ort between rent seeking and the assignment for the principal.
In both categories, how to distribute the e¤ort is decided by the agent privately, unobservable
to the principal, not by bargaining between the principal and the agent. The problem concerned
is thus an incentive problem only. Actually, all the three categories discussed above are driven
by incentive balance, either between tasks (the incentive theory and the rent-seeking theory) or
between players (GHM).
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The fourth and the last category of the theory of the rm, relational adaptation theory
(Simon (1951) and Williamson (1971, 1975, 1991) etc.), pays attention to control problems.
However, it does not have a formal model examining the trade-o¤ between control and incentive;
although Williamson (1975, 1991) argues, only informally, for the trade-o¤ between adaptation
and incentive, where adaptation, if decided through bargaining, could be on the control side, he
does not microfound the trade-o¤ on the information structure, as is done by this chapter to
di¤erentiate control from incentive. Moreover, that literature does not consider the allocation
of ownership of physical capital, but is concerned with the comparison between authority or
hierarchy and market.
Beyond the literature surveyed by Gibbons (2004), some papers also consider control prob-
lems. Hart and Holmstrom (2002) shares with this chapter the point that integration brings
about too much coordination (control) while non-integration brings about too little. The two
papers di¤er in the cost of integration; it is incentive loss of the agent in this chapter, but the
loss of the private benets of managers and workers in Hart and Holmstrom (2002). Rajan
and Zingales (2002) considers the control problem of keeping the employees to work for the rm
rather than to steal the critical resources. However, in that paper the trade-o¤ is between growth
of the rm and the risk of being expropriated.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We rst presents the model, then analyze all
the possible contractual arrangements (called regime) one by one, then they are compared to
nd the equilibrium arrangement, and lastly we conclude and presents some empirical evidence
that supports the theory of the chapter.
II.1 The Model
The model consists of a principal (denoted by P), an agent (A) and a capital (K). K is indis-
pensable for A to create value; on the other hand, As human capital is indispensable for K to
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be utilized. The core question is how to use ownership of the physical capital to control As
human capital, the meaning of control being given as follows. Using K, A could engage into two
exclusive projects. One is done to coordinate with Ps integrated strategy and leads to a product
that is specic to Ps need and worth little to the market. The other project is independent of
Ps strategy and leads to a product that is of general interest and is to be sold to the market. The
value of either product depends on the human capital investment A makes before the project is
chosen and the e¤ort level he exerts after the project choice. The specic project is denoted by
"cd" and the general one by "in". Both players are risk neutral.
Timing:
There are ve dates. At date 0, P and A decide the allocation of ownership and payo¤ right
of K. Here ownership means, as GHM, residual control rights, namely that the owner walk away
with K putting it in the alternative use when the bargaining fail to reach an agreement. And
payo¤ rights mean the ownership of the nal product. At date 1, A makes the human capital
investment. The investment is specic to the capital, namely, if it helps nothing if A does not
operate with K. At date 2, the state is realized, and P and A bargain on the project choice. At
date 3, A chooses the e¤ort level to do the project chosen at date 2. At date 4, the product of
the project is yielded, and is traded if P has no payo¤ rights. An arrangement of the ownership
and payo¤ rights of K is called a "regime". The timing is illustrated in gure 1 below.
Regime Investment State & project Product
0 1 2 43
effort
Figure 4: Timing Tree
The values of the two projects are as follows. If A invests i 2 [0;1) at date 1 and exerts e¤ort
level e 2 [0;1) at date 3, and the realized state is s 2 [0; 1], then the value of the specic product
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is vcd(i; e) and the value of the general product is vin(i; e; s) = svcd(i; e): As s 2 [0; 1]; given the
investment and e¤ort level, the specic project is always worth more and the excess is the benet
of coordination. To capture the benet, let vcd(i; e) = v(i; e)+B; where v(I; 0) = v(0; e) = 0 and
B  0; thus B has no incentive e¤ect upon i or e and captures only the benet of coordination.
Denote by ci(i) the cost of the investment and by ce(e) the disutility of the e¤ort. Assume, as
usual, that the value functions are strictly increasing and concave and that the cost functions
are strictly increasing and convex.
Information:
The project to be done is not contractible before date 2 and is contractible at the date (so
that P and A bargain on it). The investment level, i, is not contractible and made privately by
A at date 1, but observable at date 2; and the value of the product is never contractible but
observable at date 4. Both assumptions are standard in the literature of incomplete contracting.
The e¤ort level e; is never observable to P, as in a typical moral hazard problem. Therefore,
no contract conditional on the value of the nal product is feasible to induce A to choose some
levels of i or e. He is incentivized only by obtaining the payo¤ rights. Including both the ex ante
investment and the ex post e¤ort seems redundant, and any one of them su¢ ces to show the
trade-o¤ between incentive and control. Nevertheless, the purpose of introducing the e¤ort is to
show that the theory of the chapter does not rely on specic investment, as GHM does and the
purpose of introducing the asset-specic investment (i) is to show that the theory is rick enough
to incorporate GHM.
Assume s uniformly distributes on [0; 1] before date 2. Di¤erent from the literature, the
realized state, s; is the private information of A at date 2. P may deduce s from the observed
value of the general product (if it is yielded) at date 4. Information asymmetry is a way to
capture bargaining costs. Nevertheless, that is the only place digressing the standard set-ups.
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Assumption (Incomplete Contracting): at date 0, P and A can do nothing but decide the
allocation of the ownership and payo¤ rights of K.
To be sure, P and A could learn a lot from the implementation theory to design some clever
mechanisms on how to choose the project at date 3 and how to trade the product at date 4. Thus
the assumption is either justied by bounded rationality of both players (they may know nothing
about game theory, not even say Maskin-Moore Theorem), or insisting on perfect rationality, by
some way of Hart and Moore (1999).15
Anyway, by the assumption, the project choice is decided via bargaining between P and A at
date 2, and if A has the payo¤ rights, the price of the specic product is decided via bargaining
at date 4. Assume that both P and A has equal bargaining power, that is, each party has chance
1
2
to make a take-it-or-leave-it (tioli) o¤er to the other.
So the project choice is negotiable when it is being decided, while the choices of the investment
and the e¤ort levels are not. Therefore, the former is on the control side and the latter on the
incentive side. We call it loss of control(for P) if the specic project is not chosen at date
2. The specic project entails incentive loss since half of its products value is appropriated
by P. Therefore, it is not always socially e¢ cient, even though given the levels of the incentive
variables, it is worth more than the general project. We call it too much coordination, if the
specic project is chosen even when it is not e¢ cient, and too little coordination, if it is not
chosen when it is e¢ cient.
15I ever consider such a set-up. Besides the two relevant projects, each party could think out innitely possible
ine¢ cient projects to abuse the other party, like extremely low cost but low value projects and extremely high
cost but high value ones. And as Hart and Moore (1999) does, suppose renegotiation cannot be excluded. Then
probably, as in that paper, ex ante null mechanism is the best mechanism. I cannot prove that strictly, but I can
show that any mechanisms allocating decision rights (like P decide, or A decide, or P speciy an extent within
which A chooses etc.) do nothing better.
42
At date 0 P and A choose from the four following alternative regimes. The equilibrium regime
will be the one that maximizes the total surplus because side payment is feasible.
Regime 1: A has the ownership and the payo¤ rights of K.
Regime 2: P owns K and A has the payo¤ rights of K.
Regime 3: A owns K and P has the payo¤ rights of K.
Regime 4: P has the both.
In regime 1, A is an independent contractor. In regime 2 A is a division of an M-form
organization; the ownership of non-human capitals (K and Ps other capitals) is centralized in
the hands of P, but A has an independent account and owns what he produces. Regime 3 is
actually an exclusive dealing arrangement, as A can only supply P. In regime 4, A is a salaried
employee of P in the ordinary sense. It will be shown that regimes 3 and 4 are dominated by
regime 2. Thus what matters is the allocation of ownership of K. Following Grossman and Hart
(1986), regime 2 is called "Integration" and regime 1 "non-Integration". And to justify regimes
3 and 4 we could introduce the value of K in a manner of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), which
is not pursued here.
The next section will solve the outcome for each of the regimes.
II.2 The Four Regimes
We apply backward induction to solve the outcome for each regime.
II.2.1 Independent Contractor (Regime 1)
In regime 1, A is an independent contractor of P and has both the payo¤rights and the ownership
of A. Then at date 4, A owns the product of the chosen project. If it is the general project, then
he obtains the general product and sells it to the outside market at price vin. If the project is
cd, he obtains the special product that only P demands. Then the two bargain over the price
of the specic good. Given the bargaining power distribution is 05-0.5, the price is 1
2
vcd.
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At date 3, the e¤ort level is chosen to maximize vin(i; e; s)   ce(e) with the general project,
or to maximize 1
2
vcd(i; e)   ce(e) with the specic project. Note that vin(i; e; s) = svcd(i; e); so
the two problems can be unied. Let V (i; s) be the value of the problem maxe svcd(i; e)  ce(e);
and e(i; s) be the maximizer. When we are discussing what happens after date 1, argument
i is neglected for simplicity. Then A chooses e¤ort level of e(s) with the general project and
that of e(0:5) with the specic project. And V (s) is the social value of the general project in
s at date 2 and that of the specic project is V (1
2
) + 1
2
vcd(e(0:5)). Let es be the solution of
V (1
2
) + 1
2
bvcd = V (s): Then es > 12 . Then, the e¢ cient project is the specic one if s < es and is
the general one if s > es:
At date 2, P and A bargain on the project to be done, as follows. Since under the regime A
owns the capital and the nal product, he can go straightforwardly for the general project, if he
wants. Or he chooses to bargain with P on the price which she pays for him to do the specic
project. If he chooses so, the nature decides who has the chance to make a take-it-or-leave-it
(tioli) o¤er to the other. With probability 0.5, A o¤ers tioli to P; if she takes it, the specic
project is chosen; if she leaves it, A comes back to the general project. With probability 0.5, P
o¤ers tioli to A; if A takes it, the specic project is chosen; if A leaves it, he comes back to the
general project. Thus game tree is the following:
A
“in”
Bargain over “cd”
A tioli
P tioli
0.5
0.5
P
accepts
cd
P refuses in
A accepts cd
A refuses in
Figure 5: game tree of bargaining on the project choice under regime 1; "in" represents the general
project and "cd" the specic
44
Notice that in the game above at stage 1 strategy "in" is weakly dominated by "Bargain
over cd" for any realized state s, because choosing to bargain A can still pick "in", if he wishes,
simply by rejecting Ps o¤er or tendering P with an unacceptable o¤er. Thus, at stage 1, A
always chooses to bargain and this choice signals nothing of As private information. Denote by
T the price P pays to A. From the specic project, P obtains one half of the specic products
value bvcd  vcd(e(0:5)). Therefore, she will reject any asked price T > 12bvcd; and A will ask 12bvcd
when he o¤ers tioli and wants it to be accepted, which then gives him V (1
2
) + 1
2
bvcd: He obtains
V (s) if the tioli is rejected. So his payo¤ is maxfV (1
2
) + 1
2
bvcd; V (s)g when getting the chance to
o¤er tioli. The argument also shows that when A o¤ers tiolio, the project choice is e¢ cient: the
specic project is chosen i¤ s  es: This is intuitive, as P has no private information.
Consider the case where P o¤ers tioli. A gets V (s) from the general project in state s, and
V (1
2
) + T from accepting Ps o¤er. Then he accepts her o¤er if and only if V (1
2
) + T  V (s):
The following happens.
Lemma 9 P will o¤er T = 0 and A accepts it i¤ s  0:5:
Proof. When having the chance to o¤er tioli, Ps problem is maxT Pr(V (12)+T  V (s))(12bvcd 
T ): Notice that the solution of the problem is internal, and thus satises the rst order condition
(FOC). Do the variable transformation T = V (t) V (1
2
): Then the problem becomes maxt Pr(t 
s)(1
2
bvcd+V (12) V (t)) = maxt t(12bvcd+V (12) V (t)); given s is distributed uniformly. By envelop
theorem, V 0(t) = vcd(e(t)): The FOC of the problem is
1
2
bvcd + V (1
2
)  V (t)  tvcd(e(t)) = 0:
It is easy to see that t = 1
2
is a solution as bvcd = vcd(e(0:5)): And it is the unique solution:
V (t) + tvcd(e(t)) is an increasing function of t as e(t) is increasing.
Summarize the two case. if s  0:5; the specic project is chosen denitely; if 0:5 < s  es;
it is chosen with probability 1
2
; if es < s; it is never chosen. Then
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Corollary 1 Under regime 1, ex ante there is loss of control with probability 1  es+ es 0:5
2
.
Note that when 0:5 < s  es; the specic project is not chosen when P o¤er tioli, even though
it is the e¢ cient one. Thus,
Corollary 2 Regime 1 induces too little coordination; whenever the specic project is e¢ cient,
it is always chosen, while with probability es 0:5
2
; the specic project is e¢ cient but not chosen.
Then we move on to the ex ante incentive problem at date 1. At date 2, with probability
es+0:5
2
"cd" is chosen and the total surplus is V (i; 0:5) + 1
2
vcd(i; e(i; 0:5)): And if s > es "in" is
denitely chosen and the expected surplus is E(V (i; s)js > es); if 0:5 < s  es "in" is chosen with
probability 0.5 and the expected surplus is E(V (i; s)j0:5 < s < es): Thus, in regime 1, the total
surplus expected at date 1 is W 1(i) = es+0:5
2
[V (i; 0:5) + 1
2
vcd(i; e(i; 0:5))] + (1   es)E(V (i; s)js >
es) + es 0:5
2
E(V (i; s)j0:5 < s < es); where es is also a function of I. When A o¤ers tioli, his payo¤
is maxfV (1
2
) + 1
2
bvcd; V (s)g and when P o¤ers tioli, his payo¤ is maxfV (12); V (s)g: Therefore,
the expected payo¤ of A at date 1, if he chooses i; is U1(i) = 1
2
E(maxfV (1
2
) + 1
2
bvcd; V (s)g +
maxfV (1
2
); V (s)g). At date 1, the investment level i1 solves maxi U1(i)  ci(i): Then, at date 0,
the total surplus is W 1(i1):
II.2.2 M-form Organization (Regime 2)
In this regime, A is a division of an M-form organization; ownership of physical capital is
centralized in the hands of P, but A keeps an independent account, in the form of owning the
nal product.
At date 4, A owns the product of the chosen project, as under regime 1. So he gets vin from
project "in" and 1
2
vcd from project "cd". And at date 3, the e¤ort level is decided accordingly,
as under regime 1.
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At date 2, the di¤erence from regime 1 presents itself. Under regime 1, the default choice is
"in", when A chooses not to bargain with P or bargaining fails to reach any agreement, because
he owns K there and can work away with it to supply the market. Under regime 2, in contrast,
P owns K and the default choice is "cd", which is the project beneting her before any side
payment from A; if A wants to do "in", he has to make the side payment to buy Ps approval.
Thus, the change of ownership of K alters the default project. This di¤erence gives P more
control over the project choice.
The bargaining process under regime 2 is similar to that of regime 1, with the di¤erence in
the default project. At stage 1, A chooses to do "cd" directly or to bargain over the price which
he pays P for her approval of "in". If he chooses the latter, then with probability 0.5, A o¤ers
P a tioli; if she takes it, inis chosen; if she leaves it, A comes back to project cd. And with
probability 0.5, P o¤ers A a tioli price; if he takes it, inis chosen; if leaving it, he comes back
to cd. The game tree is the following:
A
“cd”
bargain over “in”
A tioli
P tioli
0.5
0.5
P accepts in
P refuses cd
A accepts in
A refuses cd
Figure 6: the game tree of bargaining on the project choice under regime 2, where "cd" represents the
specic project and "in" the general
Similarly, strategy "cd" is weakly dominated to A in state s at stage 1. Thus A chooses
always to bargain and this signals nothing of his private information. If "cd" is chosen, he gets
V (1
2
) and P gets 1
2
bvcd. She gets nothing directly from "in". To buy her approval for it, A has to
pay T  1
2
bvcd and will actually pay T = 12bvcd; if he o¤ers tioli. Thus, A gets V (s)   12bvcd if he
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o¤ers tioli and wants to do "in". Remember V (s)  1
2
bvcd > V (12) i¤ s > es: Thus, when A o¤ers
tioli, "cd" is chosen i¤ s  es; without e¢ ciency loss, as under regime 1. What happens when P
o¤ers tioli is summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 10 P o¤ers price bT > 1
2
bvcd: There exists some bs < 1 such that A accepts the o¤er i¤
s  bs:
Proof. By the argument above, A accepts price T i¤ V (s)   T  V (1
2
): If he takes the o¤er,
P gets T ; if otherwise she gets 1
2
bvcd: Thus her problem is to choose T to maximize f(T ) 
Pr(V (s)  T  V (1
2
))T + [1  Pr(V (s)  T  V (1
2
))]1
2
bvcd:
T < 1
2
bvcd is never optimal, since P gets 12bvcd from the default option. f(12bvcd) = 12bvcd: And
note that V (1) = vcd(e(1))   ce(e(1)) > vcd(e(12))   ce(e(12)) = 12bvcd + V (12): Thus if T is little
bigger than 1
2
bvcd, Pr(V (s)  T  V (12)) > 0; and then f(T ) > 12bvcd: Therefore, the optimal pricebT > 1
2
bvcd:
On the other hand, P will never let T be so high that Pr(V (s)   T  V (1
2
)) = 0, and then
f(T ) = 1
2
bvcd. That is, bT < V (1) V (12). Let bs be the solution of V (s)  bT = V (12). Then, bs < 1;
and A accepts Ps o¤er if and only if s  bs.
Lemma 2 is intuitive. When A o¤ers tioli, the o¤er is 1
2
bvcd; which should be strictly less than
the price asked by P when she o¤ers tioli.
V (bs)  bT = V (1
2
): Remember, es is the solution of V (s)  1
2
bvcd = V (12). Then es < bs becausebT > 1
2
bvcd. Overall, if s  es "cd" is chosen denitely; if es < s  bs it is chosen when P is o¤ering
tioli and "in" is chosen when A is o¤ering tioli; and if bs < s "in" is chosen denitely.
Corollary 3 In regime 2 with probability 1  bs+ bs es
2
there is loss of control.
Remember that if es < s "in" is socially e¢ cient. But in regime 2 if es < s  bs it is chosen
only with probability 1
2
: Therefore,
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Corollary 4 Regime 2 induces too much coordination; the specic project is chosen whenever it
is e¢ cient, and with probability bs es
2
; it is chosen even if it is not e¢ cient.
When s < es and with probability 0.5 when es  s < bs; "cd" is chosen without any side
payment and hence As payo¤ is V (i; 0:5); with probability 0.5 when es  s < bs; A pays to P
0:5bvcd to do "in", by which he gains V (i; s) 0:5bvcd; and when bs  s; A pays either 0:5bvcd or bT to
do "in" and obtains in expectation V (i; s)  bT+0:5bvcd
2
: Thus at date 1, if choosing human capital
investment i; A expects to obtain U2(I) = bs+es
2
V (I; 0:5)+ bs es
2
E(V (I; s) 0:5bvcdjbs  s > es)+(1 
bs)E(V (I; s)  bT+0:5bvcd
2
js > bs): The investment level, i2; thus solves problemmaxi U2(i) ci(i): The
total surplus at date 1 from investment i isW 2(i) = bs+es
2
[V (i; 0:5)+0:5bvcd]+ (1 bs)E(V (i; s)js >
bs) + bs es
2
E(V (i; s)jbs  s > es): At date 0, the equilibrium surplus is W 2(i2):
II.2.3 Regimes 3 and 4
Under both regimes, at date 4 since P has payo¤ rights, A just deliver whatever produced to P.
Thus A gets 0, regardless of his e¤ort level and investment level. Thus he chooses the lowest
possible e¤ort doing the project, that is, e = 0 at date 3.
At date 2, since A always gets 0 at date 4 doing whatever project, he is indi¤erent with the
project to do and just follows Ps requirement. She will choose cdcertainly. Then at date 2
the total surplus is vcd(0) ce(0) < vcd(e(0:5)) ce(e(0:5)):16 The right hand side is the minimum
surplus under the above two regimes (the surplus for s  0:5). Therefore, under both regimes
3 and 4 there is no loss of control, but a stark loss of ex post incentive, which makes regimes 3
and 4 dominated by regime 1 or 2 in ex post e¢ ciency.
Regimes 3 and 4 also induces stark ex ante incentive loss, due to the specic assumption
that the two incentive variables are complement. Remember vcd(i; e) = v(i; e) + B. B has no
16e(s) satises the FOC sv0cd(e) = c
0
e(e): Therefore vcd(e(s)) vcd(e(0)) =
R s
0
v0cde
0(t) =
R s
0
c0e
t e
0(t) >
R s
0
c0ee
0(t) =
ce(e(s))  ce(e(0)); any s:
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incentive e¤ect and v(i; 0) = 0 for any i. Since A is going to choose e = 0 at date 3, he has no
incentive to make any human capital investment at date 1, that is, i = 0: Summarily we have
Corollary 5 Under both regimes 3 and 4 there is no loss of control but a huge loss of incentive,
both ex ante and ex post. The two regimes are thus dominated by regime 1 or 2.
We move on to compare the four regimes to nd the equilibrium regime. By this corollary, I
only need to compare between regimes 1 and 2. Following GHM, regime 2 is called integration
and regime 1 non-integration.
II.3 The Comparisons
We saw regime 1 induces more control than regime 2. Too much control is not good, because
it entails incentive loss: doing the specic project, half of the value is appropriated by P while
doing the general project, A reaps the full value, and hence the more likely is the specic project
chosen, the higher is the incentive loss. There are two dimensions of incentive, i and e. They
could interact in a complex way, to avoid which, I will separate the two dimensions: when
considering the case of one variable, the level of the other will be xed. First consider the case
of the e¤ort and thus x the choice of ex ante investment.
II.3.1: Control versus Ex Post Incentive (e)
In this subsubsection, suppose i = i (by, for example, assuming ci(i) = 1 for i > i; = 0 for
i  i). As before, for simplicity, it will be suppressed during the discussion of the subsection
below. Then, the second best project choice is "cd" if s  es and "in" if s > es: Di¤erent from
the second best, "cd" is chosen only with probability 0:5 if 0:5 < s < es under regime 1, and is
still chosen with the probability 0.5 if es < s < bs under regime 2. Figure 3 below illustrates the
probability the specic project is chosen as a function of s in the three cases.
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0.5
1
0.5 s~ sˆ 1
2nd Best:
Reg 1   :
Reg 2   :
Figure 7: the comparison of the second best, regime 1 and regime 2; the vertical axis is the probability
of choosing "cd" and the horizontal one is s.
According to the gure, the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 5 Fix i = i: Compared with non-integration, integration brings about better control,
in the sense that the specic project is chosen at a higher probability, but induces loss in the e¤ort
level. Overall, Integration induces too much coordination but Non-integration too little.
The proposition hints that integration happens i¤ the coordination benet is larger enough.
Remember vcd(e) = v(e) + B and here B measures the importance of coordination and has no
incentive e¤ect. Regime 2 arises if and only if it generates a higher social surplus than regime
1. Then what the proposition above hints is strictly expressed in the following.
Proposition 6 If c000e  0 and v000  0; d(W
2 W 1)
dB
>  for some  > 0: That is, integration arises
in equilibrium i¤ the coordination benet (B) is larger than some critical level.
Proof. The proof is put into the appendix.
We nish examining the trade-o¤ between control and ex post incentive. We move on to
examine the case of the ex ante incentive.
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II.3.2 Control versus Ex Ante Incentive (i)
In this subsection, we assume e = e always, and for simplicity, we neglect argument e in all
functions and without loss of generality let ce(e) = 0. Thus, if at date 1 A invests i, the social
value of cdis vcd(i)  v(i) +B.
Since there is no ex post incentive problem, V (i; s) = svcd(i) for all s. In this setting, it is
straightforward to verify es = bs = 1. Because there is no problem of ex post incentive, the specic
project is always e¢ cient. As this is the common knowledge, it cannot be negotiated away if it
is the default project. Therefore, regime 1 implements the second best project choice. However,
under regime 1, where the default project is the general one, there is positive probability "cd"
is not chosen when P o¤ers tioli, as she trade-o¤ the probability A accepts the o¤er with the
value she obtains on his acceptance. Therefore, regime 2 strictly dominates regime 1 in ex post
e¢ ciency. However, regime 2 induces loss in ex ante incentive.
Under Regime 1, the social surplus isW 1(i) = 15
16
vcd(i), where the margin 1516 comes as follows.
Under the regime, with probability 3
4
; "cd" is chosen and so the margin is 1 and with probability
1
4
(when s  0:5 and A o¤ers tioli), "in" is chosen and the margin is E(sj0:5  s  1) = 3
4
;
therefore, the overall margin is 3
4
+ 1
4
 3
4
= 15
16
: And As payo¤ is U1(i) = 9
16
vcd(i): when "cd"
is chosen the incentive margin to A is 1
2
; and when "in" is chosen, the margin, as calculated
above, is 3
4
; therefore, the overall margin is 3
4
 1
2
+ 1
4
 3
4
= 9
16
: Under Regime 2, the social surplus
is W 2(i) = vcd(i), as "cd" is chosen with probability 1, and As payo¤ is U2(i) = 12vcd(i). The
optimal investment level under regime 1 is i1 = argmax 9
16
vcd(i)  ci(i) and that under regime 2
is i2 = argmax 1
2
vcd(i)  ci(i):
Lemma 11 i1 > i2:
Proof. : ik satises the rst order condition kv0(i) = c0i(i), for k = 1; 2, where 
1 = 9
16
and 2 = 1
2
< 1: If i() is the solution of v0(i) = c0i(i); then
di
d
= v
0
c00 v00 > 0: Then
i1 = i(1) > i(2) = i2:
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B does not have any incentive e¤ect and hence i1and i2 are independent of B: Then the
di¤erence between the ex ante total social surplus is W 1  W 2 = W 1(i1) W 2(i2) = 15
16
(v(i1) +
B)  [v(i2)+B]: Thus d(W 1 W 2)
dB
=   1
16
< 0: That is,W 2 > W 1 i¤ the importance of coordination
(B) is large enough.
Altogether, we have,
Proposition 7 Fix e = e: Comparing with non-integration, integration generates no loss of
control, but a loss in ex ante human capital investment. Integration arises i¤ the benet of
coordination is large enough to outweigh the cost of the incentive loss.
II.4 Conclusion and Empirical Evidences of Chapter Two
The literature on the theory of the rm concentrates on incentive problem. There the allocation
of physical capital ownership is driven by incentive balance, either between di¤erent tasks or
between di¤erent players. This chapter argues that incentive is just one side of allocating the
ownership rights and the other side is control and coordination. The main message is that these
two sides are in trade-o¤; better control is at price of worse incentive.
In this chapter, the economy consists of a principal-agent relationship and a physical capital.
Control/coordination side is to ensure the agent to choose the project that coordinates with the
principles integrated need, rather than the independent project; incentive side is to motivate
the agent either ex ante to make human capital investment or ex post to exert e¤ort doing the
chosen project. Depending on the allocation of ownership rights and payo¤ rights of the physical
capital, the chapter considers four regimes. In this framework, it is shown that it is e¢ cient
to give the payo¤ rights always to the agent. Thus the key is who owns the capital. If the
agent owns the capital, then he is an independent contractor to the principal and the regime is
non-integration. If the principal owns it, then integration happens and the agent is a division
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of a M-form rm as he keeps the payo¤ rights of his production but the capitals are centralized
in the principals hands. Comparing with non-integration, integration brings better control and
thus coordination but induces either ex ante or ex post incentive loss. Thus integration arises if
and only if the coordination benets are large enough to outweighs the incentive loss.
Below I present some empirical evidences to support the main conclusion that ownership
structure of physical capitals is determined by the trade-o¤ between coordination benets and
incentive loss. These evidences are hard to be explained by the other theories of the rm.
II.4.1 GM-Fisher Re-examined
The event that General Motors acquired all Fisher Bodies interest in 1926 is extensively cited
in the literature on theory of the rm since Klein et al (1978). In 2000 three papers pub-
lished by Coase, Freeland, and Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber respectively in Journal of Law
and Economics reexamine this classic story.17 Their common point is that hold-up problem and
the relationship-specic physical investment were not problems at all when GM acquired Fisher
Body. There obviously existed no important incentive problem in this instance either. About
the motivation of integration, Coase says little; Freelands point is that the primary factors
leading to vertical integration were GM managements fears over the Fisher brothersimpending
departure, coupled with problems of nancing new body plants;18 Casadesus-Masanell & Spul-
ber hold that vertical integration was directed at improving coordination of production and
inventories, assuring GM of adequate supplies of auto bodies, and providing GM with access to
the executive talents of the Fisher brothers.19
In a word, integration was implemented mostly for coordination, in the design of car bodies
17See Coase, R., The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 15-31; Freeland, R., Creating Holdup
through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 33-66; Casadesus-Masanell, R. & D. Spulber, The Fable of
Fisher Body, 67-104.
18Page 33 supra.
19Page 67 supra.
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and the supplies of closed bodies, to which it is critical to retain and control Fisher brothers
human capitals that were indispensable to the production of closed bodies.20 In addition, the
integration occurred in 1926 because about that time closed bodies were coming to have strategic
importance.21 That is, the benets of coordination became high. Below we elaborate on these
two points.
From 1924, the automobile market began to transform, the design and the styling of closed
bodies became the primary method of achieving product di¤erentiation and dening a new
line of cars.22 Acquiring Fisher Body, GM not only increased (its) output but also deprived
competitors of closed-body capacity, thus establish its competitive advantage. This is the
second point.
For the rst point, the three papers point out two kinds of coordination between GM and
Fisher Body. One was the technological coordination. Responding to that transformation in auto
market in 1924, GM took the policy of introducing annual model changes. . . .23 Then with
annual model changes, redesigns of chassis and bodies would require ongoing consultation and
coordination between Fish and the car divisions.It is hard to contract on design and innovation
since they are notoriously di¢ cult to foresee and describe, on which GM wanted a bigger say
than it had before.
The other kind of coordination is for the sake of competition. GM wanted to cut its com-
petitorsaccess to Fisher Body, and more importantly, to Fisher brothershuman capital. The
former end could be accomplished by an exclusive dealing contract that bound Fisher Body to
supply only GM. The draw back of the contract is that it cannot prevent Fisher brothers from
20GMs management believed that Fishers physical assets would remain relatively useless without the con-
tinued involvement of the Fishers, Page 53 supra.
21Freeland, Page 52, A second factor contributing to vertical integration was Fishers increasing strategic
importance.
22Freeland, pp 52.
23Freeland, pp 50.
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serving GMs competitors in a way that was dispensed with Fisher Body. To e¤ectively control
the human capital of Fisher brothers, it was necessary for GM to acquire all the capital they
operated with and make them its employees (and also shareholders).
Thus GM-Fisher story is thus an evidence to the theorys assertion that integration is to
accomplish the benet of coordination, and through enhanced control over the agents human
capital.
II.4.2 Retail Contracting
Manufacturers sell their product to consumers through the retail outlets owned by themselves
(vertical integration) or through independent retailers (non-integration). Extensive empirical
work has been done on this choice. Lafontaine and Slade (1997) provide a good survey. In retail
contracting, as they point out, generally there are no important relationship-specic assets or
investment. Lafontaine & Shaw (2001) , using an extensive longitudinal data set on franchising
rms, show that after eight or more years stable development franchisors maintain a stable rate
of company-owned outlets to the franchised ones. The stable rates vary considerably across
sectors, and they nd that brand-name value is a primary determinant, high brandname value
franchisors targeting high rates of company ownership. They argue that that is because high-
value franchisors need to exert more direct managerial control over outlets to avoid or reduce
the free riding of franchisees on brandname value. The brand-name value is therefore a good
proxy for the benet of coordination and their argument ts into the theory of the chapter very
well. In some cases, the e¤ects on brandname value are measured by outlet sizeor previous
experience required. Lafontaine & Shaw (2001) pointed out the e¤ects of these two variables
on company ownership is inconsistent with agency theory, which predicts that high monitoring
costs implied by big size or high managerial experience tend to lessen company ownership.
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Chapter Three: The Allocation of the Liability to In-
vestors: Why Financial Intermediation?
III.0 Introduction of the Chapter
This chapter o¤ers a new approach to compare various modes of nance; this approach potentially
has a broad range of future applications. The many nancial modes of our world can roughly
be divided into two classes, direct nance and nancial intermediation (FI). Under the former,
the capital goes from investors directly to entrepreneurs; under the latter, it goes rst to an
intermediary, such as a bank, and then is invested by the intermediary in entrepreneurs. How to
di¤erentiate these two classes of nancial modes poses a challenge at rst place. Apparently, the
capital changes hands once more under FI, but this simple fact can hardly make any di¤erence.
Some, such as Diamond (1984), maintains that the di¤erence is that the intermediary provides
not only intermediation of the ow of the capital, but also some extra service, such as monitoring,
which helps with some friction of nance; this extra service enables FI to dominate direct nance
despite of it adding one more level of agency problem. This extra-service point of view, however,
preassumes the service and the intermediation of capital ow are bound together. In principle,
this is not always the case; alternatively, the service can be provided by a specialist, while the
capital goes from investors directly to entrepreneurs. These two alternatives have been recognized
by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)24, but cannot be distinguished in their paper.
This chapter is the rst to propose that nancial modes are decided by who takes the liability
to repay investors. Where the service provider alone takes it, the mode is of FI; where entrepre-
neurs, by some means, take it, the mode is of direct nance. Comparing various nancial modes
consists in comparing the according allocations of the liability, whereas the way of capital ow
24In their paper, the service is also called "monitoring", but means something di¤erent from that in Diamond
(1984); the e¤ect of monitoring in the former is rather to address a moral hazard problem of entrepreneurs.
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makes no di¤erence but hallmarks the liability allocation. It is the economics of this liability
allocation that decides one mode or another rises up in equilibrium.
This chapter illustrates one case of such economics in an economy where it is costly for the
investors to verify the entrepreneurs outputs (through auditing)25, but it is cheap for some
expert to observe the outputs through monitoring. By the argument of Diamond (1984)26, FI,
owing to providing a service of monitoring, improves e¢ ciency over the mode under which each
entrepreneur is nanced independently. From the perspective of this chapter, he has compared
two allocations of the liability: one, the expert, as the service provider, takes the liability to
repay the investors of all entrepreneurs; the other, each entrepreneur independently takes the
liability to repay his investors. Under su¢ cient diversication, the former dominates the latter,
as he has shown27. This, however, does not ensure the viability of FI, as he claims; to be viable,
FI has to dominate other possible nancial modes. This chapter exhausts all the possibilities of
nancial modes for the two-entrepreneur case28 and nds that the race is between FI and that
25Townsend (1979) for the rst time studies the contracting problem with this type of fricitions. Mookerjee
and Png (1989) extend it considering the case with stochastic auditing strategies.
26There are di¤erences between the set-up of Diamond (1984) and that of this paper, such as he uses non-
peculiar punishments rather than auditing costs. But in spirit the two set-ups are equivalent, and this paper will
replicate his key results.
27Diamond (1984) is the rst to show that FI dominates independent nance under su¢ cient diversication.
Following him, Williamson (1986), Krasa and Villamil (1992) and Hellwig (2000) among others discuss the optimal
contracts of the bank under various circumstances. But they, including Diamond, do not consider alternative
modes of nance that also accomodate monitoring and implement the benet of diversication.
28Bond (2004) also endogenizes various modes of nance for a two-entrepreneur case with a Townsendian
friction. The fundamental di¤erence is in the information technology. In his paper, the disclosure costs are
proportional to the number of agents to whom the truth is disclosed, while they are constant here. As a result,
the driving force of that paper is to raise more investors into senior classes, where disclosure happens under
fewer contingencies, while seniority plays no role here. Moreover, it is hard to apply his approach for the case of
other extra services, such as screening, while the applications of this papers approach is straightforward and is
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under which the entrepreneurs jointly take the liability under monitoring of the expert. This
mode is called Conglomeration, since it features a conglomerate where each project becomes
a division, the entrepreneur the division manager, and the monitor sits in the headquarters in
charge of nance.
This chapter then passes on to compare FI to Conglomeration for the case of a large number
of entrepreneurs, and nds the following. Conglomeration also implements the benet of diver-
sication so that diversication in itself does not drive FI, as Diamond (1984) claims; actually,
the two modes are equally good under perfect diversication. Rather, FI is driven by a Number
Advantage: under FI the investors, when default is declared, audit only one intermediary (the
bank), rather than many entrepreneur projects; the economy this brings about is measured by
the ratio of the total costs of auditing all the projects nanced by the bank over the costs of
auditing this bank. This advantage owes to the banking technology that sets up a unied and
rationalized book of all its assets, which can be easily checked. FI dominates Conglomeration
only if its Number Advantage is beyond some critical level. Surprisingly, the critical level de-
pends on the monitoring costs per project (bear in mind that monitoring is provided under both
modes). Under su¢ cient but still imperfect diversication, the bigger the costs, the lower the
critical level and thus the more likely FI wins the race. When the costs are negligible, FI dom-
inates Conglomeration only if the elasticity of auditing costs to asset scale for the bank is not
more than one half. That is, for instance, if the bank assets expand 100 times, then the costs
of auditing the bank should not increase by more than 10(=
p
100) times. It is hardly credible
that organizing the bank can technically brings down auditing costs to such a scale. However,
when the monitoring costs are positive, however small, FI can dominate Conglomeration even if
the elasticity equals one and thus the costs of auditing the bank increase linearly with its asset
scale. The monitoring costs here are the expenses with which a nancial expert acquires soft
information of the outcome of a project, and hence measure the complexity of the project in
suggested as below.
59
particular and of the economic system in general. The comparative statics, therefore, explains
the growing dominance of FI in this increasingly complex world.
Conglomeration is a prevalent mode in real life intended to implement the benet of diversi-
cation, but is overlooked by the literature that focuses this benet to justify FI because of its
failure to consider the general problem of allocating the liability. A case of this mode, which is
not even attached with the name "conglomerate", is the American clearinghouse system. Before
the Federal Reserve System was founded, during banking panics banks submitted collateral to
the clearinghouse of which they were members. The clearinghouse issued papers upon the port-
folio of these assets. These papers were initially used only in interbank clearing, to save cash for
depositors, and after the panic of 1893, they were also issued as "cash" directly to depositors.
The clearinghouse was responsible for scrutinizing the quality of all the collateral assets, but did
not set up the book of their revenues that is necessary to form a unied asset. This was thus an
mode of Conglomeration, where the member banks took the joint liability and the monitor was
the clearinghouse29.
To consider the allocation of the liability, much more than only generating new insights in that
Townsendian economy, leads to a broad range of new research on the organization of nancial
markets. For each service that addresses some friction of nance, an examination similar to that
of this chapter could be carried out. For example, let the friction be that the quality of a project
is unobservable to the investors, but is observed (possibly with noise) to some expert. There
are two modes of organizing the screening service. Either he sells directly his knowledge of good
projects to investors, and thus becomes a rating agency; or he uses his knowledge to invest, with
the capital of investors, and thus becomes a banker or fund manager. The di¤erence between
the two modes consists, again, in the allocation of the liability to repay the investors; under
the former, it is taken by the entrepreneurs, while under the latter, it is taken by the expert.
29See Gorton (1985), and Gorton and Winton (2002) (page 70-72) for details.
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This line of consideration leads us to compare, for the rst time, the rating agency to the bank.
Moreover, to consider the allocation of liability provides a new perspective on the theory of the
rm (see Gibbons (2004) for a survey). One branch of the literature (Grossman and Hart (1986)
and Hart and Moore (1990)) delineates the boundary of the rm according to the allocation
of ownership of physical capital. This chapter suggests that it be delineated according to the
allocation of liabilities to a third party (for example, the customers). Basically, if party A takes
(uncontractible) liabilities of party Bs work, then B is an employee of A, while if B himself takes
them, he is an independent contractor. Where the incentive to avoid these liabilities matters,
we will reach a theory in the manner of Grossman and Hart (1986).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Subsection III.1 sets up the model. Subsection
III.2 examines Independent Finance as the benchmark. Subsection III.3 examines FI. Subsection
III.4 examines Conglomeration and then compares it with FI. Concluding remarks and further
discussions are given in subsection III.5. Technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
III.1 The Model
The model bears a little variation from Diamond (1984) and is isomorphic to it.
Agents and Production
There are two dates, T0 for investment and T1 for return, and three classes of risk neutral
agents: entrepreneurs, investors and an expert.
There are N  2 entrepreneurs, E1; E2:::EN . Each has an independent and identical project.
Each project needs a unit capital to invest, and returns R with probability q; and nothing with
probability 1   q. All entrepreneurs are penniless at T0. There are innite potential investors,
each of whom has a small amount of capital, but the aggregate capital is well su¢ cient to nance
all the projects. The expert, called Ms X, has neither physical capital nor projects, but has the
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human capital of monitoring, which has the same meaning as it has in Diamond (1984). So
here delegated monitoring is directly assumed, while it is justied with an argument of cost
replication in Diamond (1984)30.
All agents are protected by limited liability, and no one discounts across the two dates.
Entrepreneurs are assumed to have all the bargaining power, that is, equilibrium will be driven
by maximizing their expected prots.
Information Structure and Technologies
The only friction to nance a project is that only the entrepreneur costlessly observes its
outcome, success or failure. For others to nd out the outcome, two information technologies
are available, with di¤erent costs and information strength. The weak technology is monitoring.
If the expert has been monitoring a project from T0 on, then she knows its outcome at T1
through her personal experience, but she is not able to convince others of what she knows.
The strong technology is auditing, which discloses the outcome to the public after it is realized.
Accordingly, the monitoring costs per project, denoted by m; are close to 0 and much less than
the auditing costs, denoted by C: Only Ms X knows how to monitor, but the investors can access
auditing, provided they can a¤ord C collectively31. The auditing costs here correspond to the
non-pecuniary penalties of Diamond (1984) upon an entrepreneur. Both are the deadweight
costs incurred when (actual) default happens; in both set-ups, to avoid these costs through the
cheap monitoring is the driving force for various nancial modes. There is only one di¤erence:
30This argument is not as convincing as it looks. If one million investors need to know something, it is not
necessary for each of them to pay the information cost; it would be enough that a hundred randomly chosen
investors are paid to investigate the thing, and then to independently report their ndings to the rest of the
investors. Cross check will stop anyone from lying, and there is no other incentive problem if the action of
investigation is contractible.
31Notice that here the auditing costs do not vary with the number of the agents to whom the truth is disclosed,
as is assumed by Bond (2004).
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the auditing costs are borne by the investors, while the penalties are borne by the entrepreneur.
This di¤erence does not a¤ect equilibrium since the auditing costs are ultimately borne by the
entrepreneur through the individual rationality constraint of the investors.
Ms X observes the outcome of a project at minor costs. If she never colludes with its
entrepreneur, the investors can simply rely on her word of mouth to know the outcome and the
unobservability is not a friction any more. To exclude such a trivial solution, this chapter is
going to allow all possible collusion between Ms X and the entrepreneurs. For that purpose,
it is assumed that any side transfers between some or all of these non-investors are costlessly
observable to no one but the parties involved. Denote by CK the costs of auditing Ms Xs
account if she has monitored K projects and been repaid by the K entrepreneurs. Notice that
the problem of collusion plainly precludes Maskin-Moore-Repullo mechanisms from functioning
here32. For simplicity, it is assumed that the action of monitoring is contractible, since the
according moral hazard problem of Ms X is not a necessary part of this chapter. Assume CK  C
for K  2 and C1 = C (that is, there is no technological benet for a single entrepreneur to use
monitoring service33). This CK corresponds to the non-pecuniary penalties of Diamond (1984)
upon the intermediary, as C corresponds to the penalties upon the entrepreneur. However, there
is another di¤erence here: the penalties decrease with the payment from the intermediary to the
investors in his paper34, but CK is invariant with it; introducing the auditing costs in that way
would only add technical complication.
32Any two non-investors who have the same information would act as one party. Therefore, there is no way to
design a mechanism to elicit the information.
33Diamond assumes the same, as he says "(T)he intermediary is not viable [for one entrepreneur case] because
it incurs at least as high a deadweight cost [as an entrepreneur]..." (page 400).
34In Diamonds paper, the penalties are set by the investors, in such a way that the intermediary always loses
overall as much as the total face value of its debts, whenever it defaults any part of them. In this way, the
intermediary has no incentive to lie.
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A metaphor may be helpful. Assume each of the entrepreneurs and Ms X has a box (or
pocket). An entrepreneur knows what is in his box, but cannot see into the other boxes. Ms
X knows what is in her box and can also see into an entrepreneur-box at minor costs m: The
investors have to spend C to open an entrepreneur-box, and CK to open the X-box if it has been
lled by K entrepreneurs.
Additional assumptions are laid out below.
Assumption 1: At T0 the investors commit to playing a stochastic auditing strategy.
The investors are able to commit, since the action and the costs of auditing are veriable and
thus the investors have no di¢ culty in overcoming the collective action problem in connection
with the commitment. Hereinafter, they will be dealt with as one party. This assumption of
commitment facilitates the approach of mechanism design. Without it, I have to analyze a
two-stage game, which is technically more complicated, but the main insights of this chapter
will be passed on. Diamond (1984) dispenses with this assumption, since the deadweight costs
are imposed by the investors at no expense, so they will impose the penalties whenever there
is default. In this chapter, in contrast, investors, having decided to impose auditing, must bear
the costs. The other point of Assumption 1 is that the investors enforce auditing stochastically,
whereas in Diamond (1984), they impose the penalties deterministically. This assumption of
stochastic auditing not only facilitates the mechanism design approach, but also uncovers the
indispensable role of monitoring (see the remark following Lemma 2).
Assumption 2: S  qR  (1  q)C  1 and (1  q)C  qR
2
:
Basically S is the "surplus" of a project and S  1 ensures it is worthy of being nanced. The
other part of the assumption ensures that the auditing costs are signicant enough to leverage
up various modes of nance.
Assumption 3: Securities issued to investors must bear repayments that weakly increase
with the economic fundamental.
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That is, the investors are repaid more when more projects succeed, which is a feature of
realistic securities. This assumption restricts the feasible sets of contracts to investors in the
problems of designing optimal contracts. Wang (2007) examines what happens without this
assumption for the two-entrepreneur case: then, under FI, besides the contractual arrangement
considered by Diamond (1996), another one (called "Fund" in Wang (2007)) could be optimal,
according to which the investors are repaid with the most when only one project succeeds. As is
pointed out by Wang (2007) as well as Innes (1990), when Ms X could collude with the investors,
what is assumed in Assumption 3 follows.
Bear in mind that this assumption is needed only because this chapter does not presume the
contract of one entrepreneur with the intermediary to be independent of another entrepreneur.
If that is presumed, as Diamond (1984, 1996) and those who followed did, Assumption 3 auto-
matically holds: then, the more entrepreneurs succeed, the more the intermediary obtains and
accordingly the more it pays out to the investors.
Timing
T0 Morning: The entrepreneurs cooperatively decide how to get nanced35. They decide
who takes the liability to repay investors and thus what the collateral is. Then they design
accordingly the contractual arrangement (the mechanism) between them and the investors, and
Ms X if the monitoring service is used.
T0 Afternoon: The securities are issued to investors. After buying the securities, they
commit to a stochastic auditing strategy.
T1 Morning: The outcomes of all the projects are realized. Non-investors could arrange
various sorts of collusion.
35At this time, they act as one and the same designer. I abstract away the game probably played between them
at this time, as it would be very complicated to take it into account. For example, one entrepreneurs contracts
could be contingent on the others, and vice versa, resulting in a problem of innite recursiveness.
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T1 Afternoon: The liable entity reports the performance of the collateral to the investors
and is ready to repay them accordingly. Contingent on the report, they audit the collateral
according to the committed strategy, and if the auditing uncovers any fraud in the report, they
appropriate the whole collateral36.
The Liability Allocations and the Organizations
The mode of organizing nance and the monitoring service is decided by who takes the
liability to repay investors. The investors hold claims upon the revenues of the assets of the
liability taker(s); these assets are thus the collateral to secure the claims. That an asset is (a
part of) the collateral has three implications in this economy:
I, the investors audit it contingent on the report of the performance of the collateral;
II, they appropriate the whole asset whenever auditing uncovers any fraud in the report;
III, any bit of the asset cannot be disposed of before the investors are satised, that is, either
their claims are fully repaid, or they nish auditing and appropriating the whole collateral.
These three implications decide the economics of the allocation of the liability to repay
investors. Based on the allocation of the liability, we can envisage the following modes.
(1) Independent Finance (IF): each project is nanced independently and is the collateral
upon which the entrepreneur takes the liability to repay its investors.
36Any securities to the investors must entail the rights to audit the collateral and furthermore to appropriate
a part or the whole of it whenever auditing uncovers a fraud, because this is the only way to incentivize truth-
reporting. Ex ante, the harsher the punishment, the lower the incentive to lie, and hence the less the auditing
needed. That benets the entrepreneurs, for the price of the securities has to compensate the auditing costs the
investors expect to incur. Therefore, optimally the securities will entail the maximum punishment, that is, a
fraud triggers the appropriation of the whole collateral.
A caveat about appropriation is needed. The investors do not know the value of the whole collateral if they
only audit a part of it when uncovering a fraud. In this situation, the implicit assumption is that they commit to
auditing the rest of the collateral whenever uncovering a fraud, to appropriate the whole collateral. This implicit
assumption is o¤-equilibrium path.
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(2) Joint Liability without Monitoring: the entrepreneurs, without using the monitoring
service, take the joint liability to repay all the investors upon the portfolio of all the projects.
This mode, as will be shown, is equivalent to (1).
(3) FI: as discussed by Diamond (1984), Ms X alone takes the liability to repay all the
investors, upon the bank asset that is formed by her investment in the projects.
(4) Conglomeration: the liability is taken upon the portfolio of all the projects by a con-
glomerate, where each project is a division managed by the entrepreneur and Ms X becomes
the headquarters monitoring the divisions; Conglomeration di¤ers from mode (2) in monitoring
being provided.
(5) Mode M(N;K), for K = 1; 2; :::N   1 : these are the modes mixed between (3) and
(4). Under M(N;K); the liable entity consists of Ms X and K entrepreneur, and both runs
these entrepreneursK projects and nances the other N  K projects as the intermediary. The
collateral then consists of the K directly nanced projects and the intermediary asset.
Diamond (1984), not explicitly considering the allocation of the liability, examined only FI
and IF37. As regards these two modes, all his results will be transplanted here. In fact even
the proof of his Proposition 2 can be transplanted to prove its counterpart in this chapter, as is
shown in the Appendix.
37Diamond (1984) possibly realized the existence of other nancial modes, as he said "(T)he costs of delegation
are analysed when the monitor is a nancial intermediary..." (page 398, italiced by this paper). Even so, he did
not consider them, possibly because he thought "...asymptotically no other delegated monitoring structure will
have lower costs" (page 395, italiced by this paper). However, this assertion is incorrect; as will be shown, under
large but still nite diversication, FI can be dominated by Conglomeration, though the two modes are equally
good under innite diversication.
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III.2 Benchmark: Independent Finance (IF)
In IF, each project is nanced independently and is the collateral. In this mode, Ms X adds no
value to any entrepreneur and hence is in idle, because she and the entrepreneur will act as one
party due to perfect collusion between the two.
A project has two states, success and failure. Only in the state of success are the investors
repaid, and the amount of the repayment, denoted by d; denes the security. If the entrepre-
neur reports a failure, the investors audit the project with probability l. A mechanism is then
represented by (d; l).
In the state of success, if the entrepreneur reports the truth, he lays out d to clear his liability.
If he lies and claims to have failed, with probability l; the project is audited, which uncovers
the lie and causes the whole revenue, R; to be appropriated, whereas with probability 1  l; the
project is not audited and he escapes the liability. Thus, if lying he expects to outlay lR. The
incentive compatibility constraint (IC) for truth telling is, therefore, d  lR:
With probability q the project succeeds and the investors are then repaid with d: With
probability 1   q it actually fails and they not only get repaid with nothing but also incur the
auditing costs, C; with probability l. Thus, the expected benet of nancing the project is
qd  (1  q)lC; and the individual rationality constraint (IR) is 1  qd  (1  q)lC:
Each entrepreneur chooses (d; l) to minimize d subject to the IC and IR. Substitute the IC
into the IR, 1  qd  (1  q)lC  qlR  (1  q)lC; which implies 1
S
 l; where S  qR  (1  q)C
is assumed to be no less than 1. Then, by the IR, R
S
 d: Thus, the optimal mechanism of IF is
(dI = R
S
; lI = 1
S
); and under IF a successful entrepreneur outlays dI = R
S
:
Under IF, whenever a project fails, it is audited with probability lI : If some other successful
entrepreneurs repay its liability and save the project from being audited, then the auditing costs
of lIC are saved. This is exactly the benet of cross subsidization discussed by Diamond (1984,
1996). Can the entrepreneurs, without involving Ms X, materialize this benet with a mode of
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joint liability? The answer is No, as shown below.
The collateral is the portfolio of their projects and has N+1 states, s = 0; 1; 2; ::N; dened by
the number of successful projects, and occurring with probability psN = C
s
Nq
s(1  q)N s; where
CsN is the number of combinations of picking s items out of N . A symmetric mechanism of the
joint liability mode is represented by fDs; lsgs=0;1:::;N : in state s; the investors are repaid with
Ds, to which each successful entrepreneur equally contributes Dss ; and they audit a (reportedly)
failed project with probability ls: D0 = 0 due to limited liability. A successful entrepreneur,
if telling truthfully his success, expects to outlay dJ =
PN 1
s=0 p
s
N 1
Ds+1
s+1
: If lying, his project is
audited with probability lJ =
PN 1
s=0 p
s
N 1ls; which is also the probability of an actually failed
project being audited in equilibrium. Then, the IC is lJR  dJ : The IR is 1
N
PN
s=0 p
s
NDs 
1 + C
N
PN
s=0 p
s
N ls(N   s): Notice that psN 1 1s+1 = 1Nqps+1N : Substitute this into the formula of dJ
in the IC, lJR  1
Nq
PN 1
s=0 p
s+1
N Ds+1jD0=0 = 1Nq
PN
s=0 p
s
NDsjthe IR  1q [1+ CN
PN
s=0 p
s
N ls(N   s)] =
1
q
[1 + C(1   q)PN 1s=0 psN 1ls] = 1q [1 + (1   q)ClJ ]; where for the second to last equality I apply
psN (N s)
N
= (1   q)psN 1 and psN ls(N   s)js=N = 0: Check the two ends of the chain above,
lJ  1
qR (1 q)C = l
I : Thus, a failed project is audited with probability of at least lI . Hence, the
joint liability mode cannot save the auditing costs. On the other hand, fDs = sd; ls = lIgs=0;1:::;N ;
the aggregate of the optimal mechanism of IF, is always feasible, and thus under the joint liability
mode the entrepreneurs are never worse o¤ then under IF. Therefore, the two are equivalent. To
summarize,
Lemma 12 Under IF a successful entrepreneur outlays dI = R
S
: Without Ms X, the mode of
joint liability is equivalent to IF.
The assumption of stochastic auditing is indispensable to the second part of the lemma. It
does not hold sometimes, if only deterministic auditing is allowed. Here is a counter example
for the case of N = 2. Let D2 = 2D1 = 2D; l0 = 1; l1 = l2 = 0: The IR is 2qD  2 + 2(1  q)2C
and the IC is (1  q)R  D: If 2q(1  q)R  2 + 2(1  q)2C , (1  q)S  1; then with a range
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of (q; R; C); the IR and the IC are satised, and hence auditing occurs only in state 0 under the
joint liability mode, where it occurs in both states 0 and 1 under IF.
How does monitoring help materialize the benet of cross subsidization? Because joint liabil-
ity saves a failed project from being audited, it gives a successful entrepreneur higher incentive
to hide his success. This incentive compatibility problem dissipates all the benet of cross subsi-
dization. Where Ms X knows the outcome of each project through monitoring, an entrepreneur
has to buy his silence to hide success, which lessens the incentive to do that.
There are various modes of accommodating the monitoring service. First, as presupposed by
Diamond (1984), there is the mode of FI, where Ms X is a banker. This mode is examined in
the next section, which, besides re-deriving the results of Diamond (1984), solves for the speed
of convergence and the order of the rent to the banker.
III.3 Diamond World: B-Model
Under this mode, Ms X alone takes the liability to repay investors. At T0, she issues securities in
exchange for the investorscapital and then invests it to nance the N projects; this investment
forms the bank asset, the collateral under this mode. At T1, she collects repayment funds from
the entrepreneurs, reports the funds and uses them to settle her liability to the investors. The
investors audit the bank asset with a probability contingent on the report, at costs CN  C:
Denition 3 FI has "Number Advantage", if CN < NC:
NC are the total costs of auditing N projects, each at costs C: Compared to IF, FI reduces
the number of to-be-audited boxes from N (entrepreneur-boxes) to 1 (X-box). If CN < NC;
then organizing FI technically saves auditing costs. In Diamond (1996), C2 = 2C38; and hence
no number advantage is assumed.
38There the costs are the destruction of the low output, L: Thus C = L and C2 = 2L:
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Below I conduct a fully edged analysis for the case of N = 2 and then describe what happens
for the case of N being large. In this section, the marks of some equations are su¢ xed with "b"
to indicate that they are peculiar to the mode of FI, where Ms X is the "b"ank.
III.3.1 N = 2 Case
The economy has three states s = 0; 1; and 2; dened by the number of successful projects. A
general asset contract of the bank is fdsgs=0;1;2; and a liability contract is fDsgs=0;1;2; where in
state s; each successful entrepreneur repays the bank with ds and it then passes Ds to the in-
vestors. At T0; the investors, facing fds; Dsgs=0;1;2; commit to auditing the bank with probability
ls in reported state state s. A mechanism is thus fds; Ds; lsgs=0;1;2:
By limited liability for X and the entrepreneurs,
D0 = d0 = 0; D1  d1  R and D2  2d2  2R (LL)
According to implication III of being the collateral, the bank always extracts as many funds
from the entrepreneurs as possible. There is no such collusion in which the entrepreneurs ll
nothing into the X-box (i.e. the bank asset) rst, making Ms X declare default and her box
audited always, and then compensate her after the auditing; because under FI, by implication
III, they are free to and will dispose of whatever remains in their boxes while the bank is being
audited, leaving nothing for the compensation afterwards. So, in state s; the bank has in its box
(at least) sds:
Consider the IC for the bank to truthfully report the return of its asset (the collateral).
Suppose the state is 2. If honoring the contracts, the bank repays the investors with D2: If
instead it lies that the state is 0, then with probability l0, the investors audit the bank asset
and appropriate all its revenues, 2d2 in this state, while otherwise the bank escapes the liability
payments. Thus, if telling the lie, the bank expects to outlay l0  2d2: The IC for the bank not
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to misreport state 2 to be 0 is, thus,
l0  2d2  D2 (G20b)
Alternatively the bank could lie that the state is 1. Then, with probability l1; it loses 2d2; as the
lie is uncovered, and with probability 1  l1; the report is accepted as the truth and accordingly
the bank outlays D1 to the investors. The IC for not to misreport state 2 to 1 is, thus,
l1  2d2 + (1  l1)D1  D2 (G21b)
When the true state is 1, misreporting it to state 2 is never protable, since by Assumption
3, D2  D1: Thus, if state 2 is reported, it must be the truth and l2 = 0. If the bank lies that
the state is 0, it expects to lose the whole asset, now worth d1; with probability l0; and nothing
otherwise. Thus, the IC for not to misreport state 1 to 0 is
l0d1  D1 (G10b)
The investors obtain D1 and D2 in state 1 (with probability 2q(1   q)) and state 2 (with
probability q2) respectively. They expect to incur auditing costs of [(1  q)2  l0+2q(1  q)l1]C2:
The IR for them to invest in the bank is
q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1  2 + [(1  q)2  l0 + 2q(1  q)l1]C2 (IR-Ib)
Facing the bank contract C  fds; Dsgs=0;1;2; the investors commit to the strategy flsgs=0;1;2
that minimizes the auditing costs subject to the ICs and IR above. Denote the optimal strategy
by fls(C)gs=0;1;2: As mentioned above, l2(C) = 0:
The three ICs above guarantee that any misreport of the state does not make the investors
lose. Even when these ICs hold, a successful entrepreneur, however, could still be exploited by
Ms X through partial collusion39. Suppose the true state is 2. She may arrange collusion in
39A failed entrepreneur has nothing to be exploited. It is called "partial" as the collusion does not involve all
the non-investors.
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which she collects t < d2 from E1 to buy his silence when she declares state 1 to the investors
and E2. Then she collects d1 from E2; besides t from E1; and repays the investors with D1; if this
fraud is not uncovered, which happens only with probability 1  l1; otherwise, she loses all. The
IC for no partial collusion of misreporting state 2 to 1 is, thus, 2d2  D2  (1  l1)(d1 + t D1)
for any t < d2. Equivalently,
2d2  D2  (1  l1)(d1 + d2  D1) (P21b)
When the true state is 1, Ms X could arrange partial collusion in which she gives  to the
failed entrepreneur and buy his silence when declaring state 240. She then collects d2 from him
and outlays D2 to the investors, who, happy to obtain D2; will not audit the bank. The IC for
no partial collusion of misreporting state 1 to be 2 is, thus, d1 D1  d2 D2   for any  > 0:
Equivalently,
d1  D1  d2  D2 (P12b)
The investors do not care how the bank deals with the entrepreneurs and thus do not take
into account the two partial collusion proof constraints when choosing the auditing strategy.
They actually get more from partial collusion if the constraints are not satised: in state 1, they
obtain D2 instead of D1; in state 2, if (1   l1)(d1 + t   D1) > 2d2   D2 (the partial collusion
occurs), they obtain l1(d1 + t) + (1   l1)D1; which is more than D241: However, auditing by
the investors help the entrepreneurs prevent the partial collusion; the higher is l1; the looser is
(P21b).
The last constraint to consider is the IR for Ms X. She keeps the di¤erence between the asset
paid-in and liability paid-out. She incurs monitoring costs for the two projects. The IR for her
40Notice that misreporting state 1 to 2 is never protable to the coalition of all the non-investors, but it could
be protable to a subcoalition of Ms X and the failed entrepreneur at the loss of the successful one.
41The inequality, by (G21b), is implied by d1 + t > 2d2; which is derived as follows. (1   l1)(d1 + t  D1) >
2d2 D2 , (1  l1)(d1+ t) > 2d2+ (1  l1)D1 D2  (1  l1)  2d2; where (1  l1)D1 D2   l1  2d2 is implied
by (G21b).
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is
q2(2d2  D2) + 2q(1  q)(d1  D1)  2m (IR-X)
The entrepreneursproblem is then given by
Problem 4 minfds;Ds;lsgs=0;1;2 2q(1  q)d1 + q2  2d2, subject to
(1): ls = ls(C) for s = 0; 1; 2, where C  fds; Dsgs=0;1;2:
(2): (LL), (P21b), (P12b), (IR-X), and D1  D2.
Lemma 13 The optimal mechanism of FI is D1 = D2 = d1 = d2 = dB =
2+(1 q)2C2
2q q2 ; l0 = 1; l1 =
l2 = 0:
Proof. See the appendix. The binding constraints are (G21b), (G10b), (P21b), and (IR-Ib).
This mechanism is the same as that of Diamond (1996), though he assumes d1 = d2: The
mechanism is driven by the trade-o¤ between the auditing costs and the rent to Ms X; the rent
is due to her advantage of being the only one who knows of the overall state before auditing.
However, auditing discloses to the public what she knows, and thereby reduces her information
advantage. Thus, the more auditing is exercised, the less rent she gains. If concern about the
auditing costs dominates, then the mechanism is as above, which gives Ms X a net rent of
q2dB   2m; but triggers auditing only in state 0. If instead concern about the rent dominates,
the optimal mechanism would have l0 = l1 = 1; which gives her no rent but triggers auditing in
both states 0 and 1. Assumption 2 ensures the former concern dominates.
A successful entrepreneur outlays dB = 2+(1 q)
2C2
2q q2 under FI. FI outperforms IF i¤ d
B  dI ,
C2
C
 2(1 q) q2 RC
(1 q)2S : By Assumption 2,
2(1 q)
q
 R
C
> 1 q
q
and S  1; which implies 0 < 2(1 q) q2 RC
(1 q)2S <
2 q
1 q . As
C2
C
 1, FI never always outperforms IF. On the other hand, if 2 < C2
C
< 2 q
1 q , that is, if
FI has no number advantage, it still has a positive chance of defeating IF, because it materializes
the benet of cross subsidization, i.e. auditing only happens in state 0. To sum up,
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Corollary 6 : For N = 2; a successful entrepreneur outlays dB = 2+(1 q)
2C2
2q q2 : FI never always
outperforms IF, but it has a positive chance of winning even without number advantage.
Notice that the auditing probability under IF, lI = 1
S
; decreases with S; whereas that under
FI, lB0 = 1; is independent of S. That is due to the di¤erence in the collateral. Under IF, the
collateral of each entrepreneur is his pocket, namely his project; the plumper the pocket (the
higher is S); the less is auditing needed. In contrast, under FI, the collateral is the pocket of
Ms X, which is lled by the entrepreneurs. To have her pocket audited with a lower probability,
they have to ll more funds into it, which they denitely dislike, so they pick lB0 = 1.
III.3.2 Large N Case
The economy has N + 1 states, state s = 0; 1:::N; occurring with probability psN (hereinafter it
is simplied as ps): A general mechanism is fds; Ds; lsgs=0;1;:::;N : Similar to (G21b), the IC for
not to misreport the true state s to state t is
lt  sds + (1  lt) Dt  Ds (Gstb)
As suggested by N = 2 case, the optimal mechanism in this case is of Diamond (1984):
ds = d;Ds =

sd; for s < k
kd; for s  k

; ls =

1; for s < k
0; for s  k

for some k: That is, a successful entrepreneur
always repays d to the bank, and the banks liability contract is debt, with the total face value
F = kd; and whenever the debt is not fully repaid, the bank is audited with probability 1. The
Diamondian mechanism satises all (Gstb). It is partial collusion proof as well, because the
outlay of a successful entrepreneur is independent of her report of the economys state. Only the
two IRs, for the investors and for Ms X respectively, are left to check.
The IR for the investors is binding, as follows:
d[k
X
sk
ps +
X
sk 1
sps] = N + CN
X
sk 1
ps (IR-I-Nb)
Whether the IR for X is binding depends whether m = 0 or m > 0: Consider the former rst.
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III.3.2.1 m = 0 Subcase The IR for X is never binding. (IR-I-Nb) determines a function
d(k): Auditing happens in states s  k   1 and Ms X receives a rent in states s > k: Thus the
optimal k that minimizes d(k) is decided by the trade-o¤ between the auditing costs and the
rent to Ms X, as in the case of N = 2.
Divide byN both sides of (IR-I-Nb) and apply the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), s Nqp
Nq(1 q) 
N(0; 1); of which the dense and cumulative distribution functions are (x) = 1p
2
e 
x2
2 and 
respectively, and let k = Nq + h
p
Nq(1  q): Then, the outlay d(k) becomes
d(h) =
1 + CN
N
(h)
q +
q
q(1 q)
N
(h(1  (h))  (h))
(ob)
Given N; the optimal h satises the rst order condition (FOC):
CN
N
(h)[q +
r
q(1  q)
N
(h(1  (h))  (h))] =
r
q(1  q)
N
[1 +
CN
N
(h)](1  (h))
To solve h from the FOC explicitly, I assume limN!1 CNN = z > 0 for some  2 (0; 1]: Any
 < 1 means a big number advantage. Suppose CN
N
(h) = o(1); which is obvious for  < 1 and
to be veried for  = 1. Then, the right hand side (RHS) of the FOC 
q
q(1 q)
N
(1   (h))42:
Suppose hp
N
= o(1) (to be veried later), which, in combination with (h)p
N
= o(1); implies that
the left hand side (LHS) of the FOC  CN
N
(h)q: Substituting CN = zNa; the FOC is simplied
to
qzp
q(1  q)N
 0:5 =
1  (h)
(h)
(hb)
Lemma 14 The solution of (hb) is hBN =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
p
q(1 q)
qz
N0:5  + o
bh
 p(2  1) logN + o
if
 < 0:5
 = 0:5
 > 0:5
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
; where bh is
the unique solution of qzp
q(1 q) =
1 (h)
(h)
:
42Hereinafter, the notation y  x; sometimes denoted as y = x+ o; means y xx ! 0 if x 6= 0; or y ! 0 if x = 0:
The notation y = O(x) means y  x for some  > 0:
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Proof. See appendix.
So indeed hp
N
= o(1) and CN
N
(h) = z(h) = o(1) for  = 1: A successful entrepreneur
outlays dBN = d(h
B
N): By (ob) and Lemma 3
43,
dBN =
1
q
+
 O(q 1
N1  ), if   0:5
O(
q
(2 1) logN
N
) if  > 0:5

(db)
(db) gives the speed of dBN converging to
1
q
:
The rent to Ms X is VN =
P
sk d
B
N(s  k)ps: Apply the CLT and the fact that dBN  1q ; and
let s = Nq + t
p
Nq(1  q). We have VN 
p
Nq(1 q)
q
R1
hBN
(t   hBN)(t)dt: The integration equals
(hBN) hBN(1 (hBN)): It converges to (bh) bh(1 (bh)), for  = 0:5; and to  hBN for  > 0:5
(hBN !  1); if a < 0:5 and thus hBN = O(N0:5 ) > 0; it is smaller than (hBN); which multiplied
by
p
N still goes to 0. Therefore, VN =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
o
O(
p
N)
O(
p
(2  1)N logN)
if
 < 0:5
 = 0:5
 > 0:5
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
. This gives
the order of the rent to Ms X.
III.3.2.2 m > 0 Subcase Without considering the IR for X, the rent to her is at most in the
order of
p
N logN: It is dominated by Nm for large N if m > 0. Therefore, if m > 0; the IR for
X is binding,
d
X
sk
(s  k)ps = Nm (IR-X-Nb)
We have two equations, (IR-I-Nb) and (IR-X-Nb), for the two unknowns, d and k: The unique
solution is denoted as bd and bk44: Given no rent to Ms X, the costs of FI consist of the monitoring
costs (Nm in total) and the auditing costs. Now I go on to gure out the latter. When N goes to
innity, the average expected auditing costs go to zero. Thus, the total face value of the debt is
43 1+x
q+y  1q (1 + x)(1  yq )  1q + xq   yq2 if x; y  0: For the fraction of dBN ; x = o(y) when  < 0:5; and y = o(x)
when  > 0:5:
44By (IR-I-Nb), d is decreasing with k; but by (IR-X-Nb), it is increasing. Thus, there is a unique pair of d
and k that satises both equations.
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F = N+o; and the principal part of the repayment from each successful entrepreneur o¤sets the
sum of the investment costs plus the monitoring costs, that is, bd = 1+m
q
+ o: In this mechanism,
bk bd = F , so bk = qN
1+m
+ o: By the CLT, the probability of auditing the bank approximates to
(
bk Nqp
Nq(1 q)) = (
 m
1+m
q
qN
1 q ), which multiplied by CN gives the total expected auditing costs for
this subcase. Therefore, an successful entrepreneur outlays
bd  1 +m
q
+ (
 m
1 +m
s
qN
1  q )
CN
qN
(db)
III.3.2.3 Summary for large N Case In either subcase, when N goes to innity, d goes to
1+m
q
; even if CN
NC
> 1 ( = 1 and z > 1); that is, even if FI has no number advantage. Thus
FI always outperforms IF, as 1+m
q
< R
S
45; which is the point of Diamond (1984). The following
corollary summarizes the two subcases:
Corollary 7 For large N; no matter if FI has number advantage, dBN converges to
1+m
q
; as shown
in (db) for m = 0 and in (db) for m > 0: The rent to Ms X is in the order of at most
p
N logN
if m = 0 and is 0 if m > 0. In both subcases FI always outperforms IF.
Diamond claims that, as FI outperforms IF, it is viable; not because of the number advantage,
but because of the benet of cross subsidization amplied by the LLN. However, FI is just one
mode of materializing the benet. The next section examines an alternative mode, which is as
much blessed by the LLN as FI. To outperform this alternative mode, the only pillar of FI is
number advantage.
III.4 Conglomeration: H-Model
In this mode, the entrepreneurs, plus Ms X, form a conglomerate, where each project becomes a
division, the entrepreneur the division manager, and Ms X sits in the headquarter monitoring the
45Because m  0 and 1q < RS ; the latter , S < qR, qR  (1  q)C < qR:
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divisions. Here funds could ow, di¤erently from under FI, directly between the investors and
the entrepreneurs. But this di¤erence does not matter at all; what matters is the di¤erence in the
collateral. To highlight this point, I suppose Ms X also intermediates under Conglomeration,
collecting and distributing the investment capital at T0, and collecting and distributing the
repayment funds at T1; in some sense, she is the chief nancial o¢ cer of the conglomerate. The
only di¤erence from FI, then, is that under Conglomeration, the collateral is not the pocket of
Ms X, but the portfolio of all the N projects.
Again, I do a fully edged analysis with the case of N = 2 and then move on to the case of
large N . In this section, the marks of some equations are su¢ xed with "h" to indicate that they
are peculiar to the mode of Conglomeration, where Ms X is sitting in the "h"eadquarters.
III.4.1 N = 2 Case
Parallel to subsection 4.1, the economy has three states, s = 0, 1 and 2, and a mechanism
is fds; Ds; lsgs=0;1;2; where in state s; a successful division gives the headquarter ds and the
headquarter repays the investors with Ds: ls has a di¤erent meaning, due to the di¤erence in
the collateral: l0=l2 is the probability of auditing each project if state 0=2 is reported and l1 the
probability of auditing the reportedly failed project if state 1 is reported46. Limited liability for
X and the entrepreneurs is (LL), the same as under FI.
Consider the ICs for the liable entity, the conglomerate now, to truthfully report the state
to the investors. Suppose the true state is 2. The conglomerate outlays D2 if honoring the
contracts. If instead it (mis)reports state 0, each of the two projects is audited with probability
l0; and only when both are not audited, the fraud is not uncovered and the conglomerate outlays
nothing; otherwise, it loses all the revenues 2R47: Therefore, the IC for not to misreport state 2
46If the report is fs; fg (project 1 succeeds and 2 fails), the truth is either fs; fg or fs; sg: In other words, if
the truth is ff; fg or ff; sg; there is no incentive to misreport it to be fs; fg: Thus, only the reportedly failed
project is audited in state 1.
47Here a caveat helps. If the investors actually audit one project only, they nd the report of state 0 is a lie, but
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to be 0 is
(2l0   l20)  2R  D2 (G20h)
If the conglomerate lies that the state is 1, then with probability l1; the reportedly failed project
is audited, the fraud uncovered, and the conglomerate loses 2R; otherwise it outlays D1; based
on the reported state. The IC for not to misreport state 2 to 1 is, thus,
l1  2R + (1  l1) D1  D2 (G21h)
Similarly, when the state is 1, the IC for not to misreport state 1 to state 0 is
l0R  D1 (G10h)
Again, misreporting state 1 as 2 is never protable, and thus l2 = 0:
The investors, facing the security C  fDsgs=0;1;2; commit to the strategy that minimizes
the expected auditing costs [(1  q)2  2l0 +2q(1  q)l1]C subject to the three ICs above and the
following IR:
q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1  2 + 2[(1  q)2l0 + q(1  q)l1]C: (IR-Ih)
Let the optimal strategy be fls(C)gs=0;1;2: We have known l2(C) = 0:
Move on to consider partial collusion. The investors want the conglomerate to truthfully
report the state, but do not care how the internal contracts, fdsgs=0;1;2; are arranged; in fact,
so long as (G20h), (G21h), and (G10h) are satised, they obtain no less than Ds from any
partial collusion. However, a successful entrepreneur could be exploited by Ms X through partial
collusion. Suppose the true state is 2. Honoring the contracts, Ms X obtains 2d2   D2: From
partial collusion in which she collects t < d2 from E2 to buy his silence when she declares state
1, she obtains (t + d1  D1)(1   l1). Previously, under FI, E2 always gains net d2   t from the
they do not know the revenues of the other project. Then, how can they appropriate these revenues? Here the
implicit assumption is that whenever they have uncovered a fraud, they commit to auditing the whole collateral
(here the two projects), for the purpose of appropriation. This commitment is o¤ the equilibrium path.
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collusion, even when the fraud is uncovered, since his pocket is not subject to appropriation
there. On the contrary, it is here; thus he obtains (1   l1)(R   t); rather than R   t; with the
collusion, while R   d2 without. The IC for no partial collusion of misreporting state 2 to 1
is, therefore, 2d2   D2  (1   l1)(t + d1   D1) for any t such that (1   l1)(R   t)  R   d2 .
Equivalently,
d2 +R D2  (1  l1)(d1 +R D1) (P21h)
Similarly, the IC for no partial collusion of misreporting state 1 to 2 is
d1  D1  d2  D2 (P12h)
Lastly, the IR for Ms X is (IR-X), the same as under FI. The entrepreneursproblem under
Conglomeration, is then
Problem 5 minfds;Ds;lsgs=0;1;2 2q(1  q)d1 + q2  2d2, subject to
(1): ls = ls(C) for s = 0; 1; 2, where C = fDsgs=0;1;2.
(2): (LL), (P21h), (P12h), (IR-X), and D1  D2 (Assumption 3).
Lemma 15 The optimal mechanism of Conglomeration is: D1 = D2 = d1 = d2 = dH =
2R
q2R+2(1 q)S ; l0 =
2
q2R+2(1 q)S ; l1 = l2 = 0:
The proof is relegated in the appendix. Similarly, (G21h), (G10h), (P21h), and (IR-Ih) are
binding. The mechanism is similar to that under FI. Again Ms X gains in net q2dh   2m.
Under Conglomeration, a successful entrepreneur outlays dH = 2R
q2R+2(1 q)S : Since d
H  dI48,
Conglomeration always outperforms IF. Intuitively, it cannot be worse than joint liability without
monitoring (equivalent to IF), as the latter can be regarded as a special case of the former where
Ms Xs advice is ignored. FI outperforms Conglomeration, if and only if dB  dH , equivalent to
48 2R
q2R+2(1 q)S  RS , 2S  q2R + 2(1  q)S , 2S  qR , 2qR   2(1  q)C  qR , qR  2(1  q)C; where
the last inequality is assumed in Assumption 2.
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C2
2C
 2
q2R+2(1 q)S : Notice that
2
q2R+2(1 q)S  149. Therefore, only if FI has "Number Advantage",
it has a chance of defeating Conglomeration. On the other hand, if C2
C
< 2; there exists a range
of (q; R) under which dB  dH .
Proposition 8 For N = 2; dH = 2R
q2R+2(1 q)S : Conglomeration always outperforms IF. FI has a
chance of defeating Conglomeration if and only if it has Number Advantage.
The comparison of the (Gijh)0j<i2 and (IR-Ih) to their counterparts under FI gives in-
tuition on how the collateral makes di¤erence. These (Gij) are tighter under FI than under
Conglomeration, since, compared to the (Gijh), each (Gijh) has the same RHS, but a smaller
LHS, for two reasons. (1) For the pairs of (G10) and (G21), it is because d1  R; or 2d2  2R,
that is, the collateral under FI (the bank asset) is always worth less than that under Conglom-
eration (the portfolio of the projects); because the bank asset is lled with the revenues out of
the projects. This advantage of Conglomeration is called "Collateral Advantage". (2) For the
pair of (G20), l0  2d2 < (2l0   l20)  2R because not only 2d2 < 2R, but also l0  2l0   l20: The
latter inequality is due to the fact that the collateral of Conglomeration is spread across the two
projects, and auditing any one uncovers the fraud. Thus, given l0; the probability of uncovering
the fraud is higher under Conglomeration than under FI. This advantage of Conglomeration is
called "Spread Advantage". On the other hand, the LHSs of the two (IR-I) are the same, but
in the RHS of (IR-Ib), the total amount of auditing, (1   q)2  l0 + 2q(1   q)l1; is smaller than
2(1  q)2  l0+2q(1  q)l1; the amount in the RHS of (IR-Ih). That is because in state 0, the two
projects are audited under Conglomeration, while under FI, it is always one bank asset. This
advantage of FI is exactly "Number Advantage". For the two-entrepreneur case, (G20) is not
binding in either mode, and hence the spread advantage makes no di¤erence. Then, the race of
FI against Conglomeration is decided by the strength of number advantage relative to collateral
49q qR+(1 q) 2S  2 since S  1 and qR  2:The latter is because 1  qR (1 q)C  qR 0:5qR = 0:5qR;
where the second inequality applies 2(1  q)C  qR:
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advantage, as shown in the inequality C2
2C
 2
q2R+2(1 q)S .
III.4.2 Large N Case
A general mechanism is fds;Ds; lsgs=0;1;:::;N : ls now is the probability of auditing a reportedly
failed project50. Consider the IC for the conglomerate to truthfully report to the investors.
Suppose the true state is s: If honoring the contracts, the conglomerate outlays Ds: If it lies
that the state is t < s, then each of the s  t actually successful but reportedly failed projects is
audited with probability lt; and auditing any one leads to the appropriation of all the projects,
worth sR; otherwise it outlays Dt: Therefore, the IC for not to misreport state s to be t is
(1  (1  lt)s t)  sR + (1  lt)s tDt  Ds (Gsth)
Compare the LHS of (Gsth) to that of (Gstb), lt  sds + (1   lt)  Dt: Collateral advantage of
Conglomeration is shown in sR  sds. The spread advantage is shown in 1   (1   lt)s t  lt;
the bigger is s  t; the more signicant is this advantage.
Consider the following mechanism. ds =

0; for s < k
d; for s  k

; Ds =

0; for s < k
kd; for s  k

and ls =
ls; for s < k
0; for s  k

for some critical value k: This mechanism exploits spread advantage to the most51,
and I guess is asymptotically optimal. For FI to outperform Conglomeration with its optimal
mechanism, it has to outperform Conglomeration with this mechanism. This mechanism is
immune to partial collusion, since for the true state s < k;Ms X never lies that it is a state t  k;
because she has no means to a¤ord kd, and for s  k; the outlay of a successful entrepreneur is
xed at d; independent of Ms Xs report of the overall state.
All (Gkth) for t < k are binding: kd = (1 (1  lt)k t) kR: It follows that lt = 1 (1  dR)
1
k t :
The binding IR for the investors is then dk
P
sk ps = N +C
P
sk 1 ps(N   s)(1  (1  dR)
1
k s ):
It would be hard to solve d out of this equation. But notice that d
R
1
k s  1   (1   dR)
1
k s 
50Because Ds increases with s; no actually failed project will be misreported as being successful.
51By the binding (Gsth), lt = 1  1k t
q
kR Dk
kR Dt increases with Dt: Therefore, Dt = 0 minmizes lt:
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log(1   d
R
) 1 1
k s
52: Since this chapter is interested nding the necessary condition for FI to
outperform Conglomeration, hereinafter I let ls = log(1  dR) 1 1k s : The bigger are these ls; the
worse is the performance; if FI loses to Conglomeration for these ls; it loses for the true ls: As
will be shown, d! 1+m
q
: Thus log(1  d
R
) 1 ! log(1  1+m
qR
) 1  : Then the IR for the investors
becomes
dk
X
sk
ps = N + C
X
sk 1
ps
N   s
k   s (IR-I-Nh)
The IR for X being binding or not depends on whether m = 0: Again, there are two subcases.
III.4.2.1 m = 0 Subcase Here the IR-X is never binding. A successful entrepreneur outlays d
with probability
P
sk ps: The expected outlay is, by (IR-I-Nh), d(k) =
N+C
P
sk 1 ps
N s
k s
k
. Apply
the CLT and let k = Nq + h
p
Nq(1  q) and s = Nq + tpNq(1  q): Then, Psk 1 ps N sk s R h  1p
Nq(1 q)
 1
p
N(1 q) t
p
q(1 q)
(h t)
p
q(1 q) (t)dt 
R h  1p
Nq(1 q)
 1
p
N(1 q)
(h t)
p
q(1 q) 
q
N(1 q)
q
G(h); and the expected
outlay becomes
d(h) =
1 + C
q
1 q
Nq
G(h)
q + h
q
(1 q)q
N
(oh)
Given N; the optimal h that minimizes d(h) satises the FOC: CG0(h)(1 + h
q
1 q
Nq
) = 1 +
C
q
1 q
Nq
G(h): Solving it for h gives:
Lemma 16 The optimal eh =  p2 log logN + o. Moreover, 1p
N
G(eh) = o(  ehp
N
):
Proof. See Appendix.
By (oh) and the latter half of Lemma 5, dHN = d(eh)  1
q+ehq (1 q)q
N
 1
q
(1   ehq (1 q)
Nq
): By the
former half,
dHN =
1
q
+
r
log logN
N
s
2(1  q)
q3
+ o (dh)
52That is because (1   x)  1   x    log x for 0 < x;   1: For the former inequality, let f(x) =
1 x  (1 x): f(1) = 0; and f 0(x) =  (x 1  1) < 0 for x < 1: Therefore, f(x) > 0 if x < 1: For the latter,
let  = x and f() =   log    (1  ): f(1) = 0; and f 0 = 1  1 < 0 for  < 1: Therefore, f() > 0 if  < 1:
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Compare (dh) to (db). dBN < d
H
N if and only if   12 ; where  = limN!1 logCNlogN is the elasticity
of the auditing costs to the asset scale for the bank. That is,
Proposition 9 For large N , if m = 0; FI outperforms Conglomeration only if the elasticity of
the auditing costs to the asset scale for the bank is no bigger than 0:5.
The elasticity being no bigger than 0.5 means that with a 100 times expansion of the bank
asset, the costs of auditing the bank increase by no more than
p
100 = 10 times. It seems
hopeless to satisfy this condition. However, I am going to show that with a positive m; the
condition for FI to outperform Conglomeration is much less demanding.
As calculated in subsection 4.2.1, the rent to Ms X is in the order of
p
N( h) = O(pN log logN).
III.4.2.2 m > 0 Subcase Again, the rent is dominated by Nm; the total monitoring costs.
Thus, the IR-X is binding in this case: d
P
sk(s   k)ps = Nm. The two IRs decide a unique
pair of d; k: As in subsection 4.2.2, d  1+m
q
and k  N
d
 qN
1+m
; and the probability of default,P
sk 1 ps; is approximately (
 m
1+m
q
qN
1 q ), the same as that under FI.
The expected auditing costs in this subcase are C
P
sk 1 ps
N s
k s < NC
P
sk 1 ps
1
k s =
NC
P
sk 1 ps  E( 1k s js  k   1)  Cv:
Lemma 17 E( 1
k s js  k   1)! m1 q log 1 q+mm ; when N !1:
Proof. See the appendix.
FI has a chance of defeating Conglomeration only if the expected auditing costs under
FI, (  m
1+m
q
qN
1 q )CN ; are no bigger than the upper bound Cv; which is equivalent to CN 
NC m
1 q log
1 q+m
m
by this lemma. Thus,
Proposition 10 For large N , ifm > 0; FI outperforms Conglomeration only if CN
NC
< 
1 qm log
1 q+m
m
:
This proposition says that FI win the race against Conglomeration only if the number ad-
vantage is beyond some critical level. This level becomes more demanding and the chance for
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FI to win becomes slimmer, when m is smaller, as 
1 qm log
1 q+m
m
becomes smaller53; and when
m ! 0; 
1 qm log
1 q+m
m
! 0 and hence the chance approaches 0, if CN is in the order of N ;
indeed, if m = 0; by the discussion the last subcase, to give FI any chance of winning the race,
CN has to be in the order of at most
p
N .
III.5 Conclusion and Discussions of Chapter Three
This chapter puts at the core the allocations of the liability to the investors, which decides the
organization of nancial markets. It has discussed the four allocations: (1) Independent Finance
(IF), where each entrepreneur takes the liability independently to his investors based upon his
project alone; (2) joint liability without the expert of monitoring, where the entrepreneurs take
the liability jointly upon the pool of their projects; (3) B-model, where the expert takes the
liability upon the intermediary asset; (4) H-model, where the entrepreneurs and the expert
forms a conglomerate to take the liability upon the pool of the projects. Diamond (1984)
considers (1) and (3). Showing that (3) dominates (1) under su¢ cient diversication, it claims
that that ensures the viability of B-model. This chapter shows that (1) is equivalent to (2) and is
dominated by (4). Thus the real race is between (3) and (4). To rise up in equilibrium, B-model
has to win over this conglomerate H-model.
the chapter shows that H-model also materializes the benet of diversication. Under perfect
diversication it is as good as B-model. Therefore, diversication does not push B-model up
to equilibrium. Under imperfect diversication, the chapter nds that B-model is actually sup-
ported by "Number Advantage", that organizing B-model reduces auditing costs because then
only one bank asset, rather than many entrepreneur projects, needs to be audited when default
is declared. This advantage has to be large enough for B-model to win over H-model to rise in
equilibrium. And the bigger are the monitoring costs, the more chance does B-model have to
53 = log(1   1+mq ) 1 increases with m: fm log 1 q+mm g0 = log 1 q+mm   1 q1 q+m  log(1 + x)   x1+x ; where
x = 1 qm : f(x) = log(1 + x)  x1+x > 0 for x > 0; since f(0) = 0 and f 0 = 11+x   1(1+x)2 > 0:
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win; if the costs are negligible, it wins only if the elasticity of auditing costs to the asset scale in
a bank is no bigger than one half. That is, if the banks asset expand 100 times, auditing costs
increase not more than
p
100 = 10 times. It hard to believe that organizing bank could reduce
auditing costs to such a scale.
Some discussions of the chapter are put below.
III.5.1 Other Allocations of the Liability
Given the main text has discussed the four above allocations of the liability, a natural question
is: do they exhaust all the possibilities? The answer is no. I illustrate it with an example of
N = 2: Here is allocation (5), where an entrepreneur, say E1; and Ms X forms an entity to take
the liability. Hence, E2s project is invested by this entity, not directly by the investors. The
collateral asset is project 1 plus the intermediary asset in project 2. Then I claim that (1)-(5)
exhaust all the possibilities of allocations of the liability.
Consider what could be the collateral asset. In the end, the revenue comes from successful
projects. That is, the repayment fund to investors is either directly from the projects, or indi-
rectly from the asset invested in them, or from the mix between the former two cases. For the
rst case where the projects are the collateral assets, the two projects are either separated into
two independent collaterals, which gives rise to allocation (1), or tied together into one collat-
eral asset, which gives rise to (2) or (4), depending whether Ms X is involved. In the second
case the investment in the two projects forms the collateral asset. That leads to FI. Moreover,
only Ms X has the information advantage that is necessary to do FI. Therefore, the second case
corresponds exactly to allocation (3). In the mixed case, the collateral asset is one project plus
the intermediary asset within the other project. Again, the intermediary has to be Ms X. Thus,
the liability is allocated to the combination of her and the entrepreneur of the directly nanced
project. This case is exactly allocation (5).
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The mixed model, though not considered in the main text, does not a¤ect the conclusions,
because it is dominated by H-model (allocation (4)). Its collateral consists of one project plus
the intermediary asset in the other project. Thus in case of default, the investors have to
audit two assets. That means that comparing to H-model, the mixed model has no "number
advantage". However, as B-model, its collateral is always worth less than the pool of the projects,
the collateral of H-model. Thus, it is dominated by H-model.
III.5.2 The Implications on the Theory of the Firm
The allocation of the liability could provide a new perspective for the theory of the rm. The
core of the theory is to di¤erentiate the market (or contractual) relationship from employment
relationship and compare their e¢ ciencies. The literature focuses on the allocation of (residual)
control/decision rights, particularly ownership rights (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990) and see more literature in Gibbons (2004)). Roughly, if party A owns some
capital that is indispensable for party B to work, then B is an employee of A; otherwise, B
is an independent contractual party. The allocation of the liability to some third party (like
customers) could be another perspective to di¤erentiate the two relationships. If A takes the
liabilities of Bs work, then B is an employee of A; otherwise, B is an independent contractual
party.
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Conclusion of the Thesis
The thesis examines the nature of the organization, both as a whole and as a stage set up for
the members to interact. Chapter One considers why and how the organization as a whole,
represented by its name, holds reputation, like a natural person, even thought it, unlike the
person, has no xed self, or type as is called in economics. The chapter nds that having
names hold reputations improves the economic e¢ ciency, because reputations, if only held by
natural persons, will die with the persons, but if held by names, they live longer than the
persons, since names are inanimate artefacts and can technically live forever. The chapter nds
that organizational reputation is driven by two mechanisms. One is the value-adding mechanism:
good types are more capable of adding value to the names than the bad types, because they
are more likely to succeed in producing high quality products. The other is the commitment
mechanism: buying highly reputable names is equivalent to committing to price the products
honestly and only good sellers are willing to make the commitment, thus sorted out by these
names. The chapter also derives the dynamics of organizational reputation in the socially best
equilibria and nd these dynamics similar to the dynamics in which personal reputation evolves.
Chapter Two and Three examine how di¤erent parties are glued together into an organization.
Chapter Two considers the optimal allocation of ownership of physical capital. The allocation
decides the boundary of the rm. Its e¤ect on control receives little attention in the literature
and is the focus of the chapter. Control means here to a¤ect the project choice of the agent,
between the general one with marketable product and the specic one with the product valuable
only to the principal. The value of either depends on the agents private choice of ex ante
human capital investment and/or of ex post e¤ort, which give rise to the incentive side of
the set-up. Given the levels of the investment and the e¤ort, the specic product is worth
more than the general product. A physical capital is indispensable for the agent to do either
project. The chapter examines when the principal owns the capital in equilibrium and when
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the agent owns. It concludes that the principal ownership improves control, in the sense that
the specic project is chosen with a higher probability, and yet reduces incentive of the agent,
compared to the agent ownership; thus the former, called integration, happens i¤ the benet
of coordination outweighs the loss in incentive. The chapter also provides a rational for M-form
organizations, with centralized ownership of physical capital to facilitate coordination, and payo¤
rights remained to divisions to give them incentive.
While in Chapter Two the glue is ownership of physical capital, Chapter Three provides a
new perspective, where the glue is the liability to investors, and challenges the view that the
benet of diversication drives Financial Intermediation (FI), a view rst established Diamond
(1984) and well accepted by the literature. This chapter argues that there is indeed the benet
of diversication, but it is also implemented by an arrangement of direct nance, called Con-
glomeration, which di¤ers from FI in who takes the liability to investors. Under FI, it is taken
by the monitor alone, who becomes the bank under FI, while under conglomerate it is taken by
the entrepreneurs and the monitor altogether. The assets of the liability taker are the collateral
that secures the investorsclaims. Therefore, under FI, the collateral is the bank asset, while
under conglomerate it is the pool of all the entrepreneur projects. The trade-o¤ between Con-
glomeration is as follows. First, if default is declared, the investors audit one bank asset under
FI but many entrepreneur projects under conglomerate. That is, FI has Number Advantage.
Second, threat of losing the collateral gives the liable agents incentive to report the true revenue.
The higher the value of the collateral, the less the incentive to lie, thus the lower the probability
auditing is exercised. The bank asset is a part of the pool of the projects and hence is always
worth less than the latter. Therefore, Conglomeration has Collateral Advantage. Under the
perfect diversication, Conglomeration is as good as FI; when the number of the entrepreneurs
is large but still nite, FI dominates Conglomeration only if its number advantage is larger than
a critical value, which depends on monitoring costs. The larger the costs, the higher the chance
FI dominates Conglomeration, which explains the increasing prevalence of FI over time.
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Appendices
A: an Example of Long Dynamics in the Basic Model of Chapter One
The analysis of this example applies (5), which is expounded in subsection 3.2. The dynamics
involves four states, as follows. In the equilibrium good sellers buy names of all the states.
S
2S
Ф
s
f
f
s s
f
SF
f
s
Figure A: the Four States Dynamics
Claim: This dynamics implements the second best surplus, rq, if and only if it degenerates
to the two-state dynamics illustrated in Figure 1, with SF equivalent to  and S to S2:
Proof : Consider which levels of e¢ ciency this dynamics can implement. By (5), good sellers
buying h-names obtain RG(h) = rq(phs   phf )   h; where h  maxfph      rphf ; 0g: As
names of all the four states are bought by good sellers on the equilibrium path, RG(h) = RG(h0)
for any h; h0; that is,
(h-h0): rq(phs   phf ) h = rq(ph0s   ph0f ) h0 :
Notice that  = 0; pf = 0; ps2f = psf ; and ps2s = ps2 : So we have the following two
equations.
(-s): rqps = rq(ps2   psf ) s:
(s-s2): rq(ps2   psf ) maxfps      rpsf ; 0g = rq(ps2   psf ) maxfps2      rpsf ; 0g:
(s-s2) implies that its two "max" terms are equal. They equal 0, otherwise ps2 = ps; which
means s2-names are equivalent to s-names: both have the same value and evolve into the same
state after either a success or a failure. maxfps2      rpsf ; 0g = 0)
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(A1): ps2      rpsf  0:
Substitute s = 0 into (-S),
(A2): ps2 = ps + psf :
Substitute (A2) into (A1), then
(A3): ps     (1  r)psf :
The surplus implemented by this dynamics is RG() = rqps. By (A3), rqps = rq ) psf = 0.
This in combination with (A2) implies ps2 = ps: But then SF -names are equivalent to -names
and S2-names to S-names. Q.E.D.
B: the Su¢ ciency of the Condition in Proposition 3
To prove the su¢ ciency, we construct a series of Norm Equilibria whenever  > (qv r)(1 rq)
r(1 q)[qv (1 rq)] :
They are supported by the following dynamics, indexed by N .
S
2S
NS
Ф
s
f
f
s
s
s
Dishonest
Honest
f
Figure B: N Dynamics
In N-dynamics, there are N + 1 states, S0  ; S1; S2:::SN ; all bought by good sellers. For
n = 0; 1:::N   1; Sn become Sn+1 after a success and  after a failure, and are thus non-
commitment names. SN are supposed to be commitment names. The value of them does not
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sway with performance (psNh = psN for any h); provided they set price 0 for useless widgets.
They are destroyed into -names if and only if they unintentionally price the useless widgets at
w.
Claim: Whenever  > (qv r)(1 rq)
r(1 q)[qv (1 rq)] ; there exists some N0  2 such that for any N  N0;
N -dynamics above is in equilibrium and implements RG > rq:
Proof: We rst gure out the ps and psN ; according to the equilibrium constraints, and then
check following two points. (1) psNf  wr ; so that SN -names are indeed commitment names; and
(2) the dynamicsRG is strictly bigger than rq: (2) is equivalent to ps > ; since RG = rqps;
which is derived by applying (5) to h = : (1) is equivalent to p(sN)  w
r
; since p(sNf) = p(sN).
h = s1; s2:::sN 1 are non-commitment names. Apply (5) to them and notice RG = rqps and
phf = 0; p(s
n+1) = p(s
n)
rq
+ rqps 
rq
; for n = 1; 2; :::; N   1; where p(sn) > ps >  is applied. It
follows that
(B1): p(sN) = ps 
1 rq (
1
rq
)N 1 +  rqps
1 rq :
On the other hand, as sN are supposed to be commitment names, they satisfy (6). Substi-
tuting p(sNf) = p(sN) and RG = rqps into it, we have
(B2):    (1  rq   r(1  q))p(sN) = rqps:
From (B1) and (B2), ps =
1 rq r(1 q)+r(1 q)(rq)N 1
1 rq r(1 q)+r(1 q)(rq)N  > ; thus, point (2) above is checked.
Moreover, when N !1; ps # ; and hence by (B2), p(sN) " 1 rq1 rq r(1 q) : 1 rq1 rq r(1 q)  > wr ,
 > (qv r)(1 rq)
r(1 q)[qv (1 rq)] : Therefore, whenever this condition holds, for large enough N; p(s
N)  w
r
and point (1) is checked. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 3 of Chapter One
Given any h-names, dene W t(h) the total values of the names that evolves from one unit of the
h-names on the tth period after. Formally, W t(h) =
P
h02Ht
(h0)p(hh0): For example, W 0(h) = ph
and W 1(h) = qhp(hs) + (1   qh)p(hf): No Ponzi requires that limt!1 rtW t(h) = 0 for any
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h names.
Claim 1: W 1(h)  ph 
r
for any h-names.
Proof : Consider all the sellers who own the unit of h-names. The sum of their return is
 ph+h+ rW 1(h), where h is the sum of their prot from selling the widgets. In equilibrium
any sellers return is non-negative and his prot is no bigger than : Thus,  ph+h+rW 1(h)  0
and h  , which implies claim 1. q.e.d.
Claim 2: W t+1(h)  W t(h) 
r
for any t and any h-name.
Proof : By mathematical induction. For t = 0; the claim is exactly claim 1. Assume the
claim is true for t = k 1: Then consider the case t = k: RememberW k+1(h) = qhW k(hs)+(1 
qh)W
k(hf): Then by induction assumption, W k+1(h)  qhWk 1(hs) r +(1  qh)W
k 1(hf) 
r
=
qhW
k 1(hs)+(1 qh)Wk 1(hf) 
r
= W
k(h) 
r
: Then the claim holds true for t = k: q.e.d.
The following claim is used as a technical tool.
Claim 3 (Comparison Lemma): Suppose sequence fxtg is dened as follows. x0 = ph =
W 0(h) and xt+1 = xt r for t  0. Then W t(h)  xt for any t  0:
Proof : By mathematical induction. t = 0; that is true by assumption. Assume the claim is
true for t = k: Then consider the case t = k+1: By claim 2, W k+1(h)  Wk(h) 
r
 xk 
r
= xk+1;
where the second inequality applies the induction assumption. q.e.d.
Then I can prove the lemma, which is about the upper bound of the prices of names.
Claim 4: for any h-name, ph  1 r :
Proof : Suppose on the contrary for some h-names, ph = W 0(h) > 1 r : Then compute the
sequence dened in claim 3. It is easy to get that xt = (1r )
t ph(1 r) 
1 r + b for some b. Then
rtW t(h)  rtxt  ! ph(1 r) 1 r > 0. That is, No Ponzi condition is violated. Q.E.D.
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The Proof of Lemma 5 of Chapter One
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. P  w
r
> qv: Thus P   c > qv   c = : In
Norm Equilibria RG > rq: For any " such that 0 < " < minfc; RGrq   g; nd h-names such
that p(h) > P   ": Then, rstly, p(h) >  as P   " > P   c > : Secondly, the names cannot
be bought by bad sellers only, since otherwise p(hf) = p(h
)+c
r
> P
r
> P; contradictory to the
denition of P . Thirdly, h-names are commitment names. Otherwise, as good sellers buy the
names, by (5), p(hs) = p(hf) + RG
rq
+ 1
rq
h; which takes the minimum value at p(hf) =
ph 
r
.
Therefore p(hs)  p(h) 
r
+ RG
rq
> p(h)   + RG
rq
> p(h) + " > P , a contradiction again.
Then, the h-names satisfy (6). RG =  p(h) +  + rqp(hs) + r(1  q)p(hf) <  P + "+
 + [rq + r(1  q) ]P ) P <  RG+"
1 rq r(1 q) : Let "! 0; P   RG1 rq r(1 q) : Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 7 of Chapter One
Consider Problem 4-n: minfphgh2H P; s.t. p = 0; (9) if ph < P ; (10); phf  ph; and l = n:
The problem is derived from Problem 3 by dropping the constraint P  w and imposing the
constraint l = n: Denote the value of the problem by Vn:
Claim 1: If V2  w; then the solutions of Problem 4-2 are solutions of Problem 3. Hence
the constraint P  w is not binding in Problem 3.
Proof : By (7), phs > ph for names not of the top value. Thus Vn > Vn 1: It follows that
if we solve the problem that is derived from Problem 3 by dropping the constraint P  w; the
value of this problem is V2: If V2  w; this constraint is not binding and the solutions of this
problem are solutions of Problem 3. q.e.d.
Claim 2: If   q+2
2 q w; V2  w:
Proof : Solve Problem 4-2. Because phs > ph for non-top names and l = 2; the rst top
names are s2-names. We saw in the proof of Lemma 5 min ps2 = 2ps   ; when psf = ps   :
On the other hand, as ps2 = P; by (10), qps =  ps2 + : From these two equations, ps = 1+q+2
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and ps2 =
2 q
q+2
: If   q+2
2 q w; V2 = ps2  w: q.e.d.
Combining the two claims, we know that the solutions of Problem 4.2 are solutions of Problem
3, if   q+2
2 q w: In the proof of Claim 2, we have found ps; ps2 ; and psf = ps    = (1 q)q+2 :
To construct fully the solution dynamics of Problem 4-2, we move on to specify the values of
other names. Since ps2 = P , ps2h = P for any h; provided the widgets are priced honestly.
The specication of psfh for h 6=  has some degrees of freedom. If psf   ,   2 q3 q ; we
set psff = 0 and psfs = ps: That is, sf -names become new names after a failure and s-names
after a success. The constraint applicable to h = sf is (9), which is satised with these prices
so specied. The full dynamics are illustrated by gure 2 in the main context. If psf > ; set
psff = psf and psfs = P = ps2. That is, sf -names remain sf -names after a failure and become
top names after a success. (9) for h = sf is satised again with these prices. The dynamics is
illustrated by gure 3.
S2-names, the top names and the only commitment names, sort out good sellers through the
commitment mechanism by Lemma 4. For non-commitment names, h =
wh
qv
=
ph phf+c
qv
; if bad
sellers ever buy the h-names. Then, S =
ps psf+c
qv
= 1; that is, S-names also sort out good
sellers.  = cqv < 1 and SF =
psf+c
qv
 1 when   2 q
3 q and SF =
c
qv
< 1 otherwise. Therefore,
bad sellers buy new names and SF -names. Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 8 of Chapter One
To ease notations, let pn denote psn and fx denote
@f
@x
: (11) becomes pn+1 = max(pn;
pn 
q
) + p1;
for n = 1; 2; :::; N   1: These equations dene pN as a function of p1; ; and N: That is, pN =
f(p1; ;N): Obviously, fp1 > 0; f < 0; and fN > 0: Let the inverse function be p1 = g(pN ; ;N):
That is, P  f(g(P; ;N); ;N); where we substitute P = pN : Then gP = 1fp1 > 0; g =
 f
fp1
> 0;
and gN =
 fN
fp1
< 0: Moreover, P (;N) is implicitly dened by (12):  P +  = qg(P; ;N),
F (P; ;N)  P + qg(P; ;N)    = 0: Then, PN =  FNFP =
 qgN
+qgP
> 0; as gN < 0 and gP > 0;
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which proves the rst half of the lemma.
For the second half, remember that N() is implicitly dened by P (;N) = w: N 0() =  P
PN
:
We saw PN > 0: To prove N 0() < 0; it su¢ ces to prove P > 0: By implicit function theorem,
P =
 F
FP
= 1 qg
+qgP
: The dominator was knew to be positive. The nominator is also positive, by
the claim below.
Claim: g < 1q :
Proof: Since g =  ffp1 and fp1 > 0; it su¢ ces to prove that  f <
1
q
fp1 : To do that,
we apply mathematical induction as to N: For N = 2; f(p1; ;N) = max(p1;
p1 
q
) + p1 =8><>: 2p1p1 
q
+ p1
; if
p1  1 q
p1 >

1 q
9>=>; : So f =
8><>: 0 1
q
; if
p1  1 q
p1 >

1 q
9>=>; and fp1 =
8><>: 21
q
+ 1
; if
p1  1 q
p1 >

1 q
9>=>; :
It is obvious that f < fp1 < 1qfp1. Assume it holds true forN = k 1: Consider the case ofN =
k: To ease notations, we keep N but suppress other arguments p1 and ; for example, f(N) 
f(p1; ;N): Then, f(k) = max(f(k 1); f(k 1) q )+p1 =
8><>: f(k   1) + p1f(k 1) 
q
+ p1
; if
f(k   1)  
1 q
f(k   1) > 
1 q
9>=>; :
So, f(k) =
8><>: f(k   1)f(k 1) 1
q
; if
f(k   1)  
1 q
f(k   1) > 
1 q
9>=>; and fp1(k) =
8><>: fp1(k   1) + 1fp1 (k 1)
q
+ 1
; if
f(k   1)  
1 q
f(k   1) > 
1 q
9>=>; :
When f(k   1)  
1 q ;  f(k) =  f(k   1) < 1qfp1(k   1) < 1q (fp1(k   1) + 1) = 1qfp1(k);
where the rst inequality applies the induction assumption. When f(k   1) > 
1 q ;  f(k) =
1
q
( f(k   1) + 1) < 1q (
fp1 (k 1)
q
+ 1) = 1
q
fp1(k): Therefore,  f < 1qfp1 holds true for N = k:
q.e.d.
By the claim, P =
1 qg
+qgP
> 0: Therefore, N 0() =  P
PN
< 0: Q.E.D.
The Proof of Proposition 6 of Chapter Two
To simplify notations, let es = e(s); vs = v(e(s)) and W (s) = maxe sv(e)   ce(e): Then V (s) =
W (s) + sB; e0 = v0 = 0: Remember bvcd = vcd(e0:5) = v0:5 +B:
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By Figure 4, the di¤erence between the two regimes is that for 0:5 < s < bs; "cd" is chosen
in regime 2 with the probability 0.5 higher than in regime 1. If "cd" is chosen, the total
surplus of the P-A relationship is V (0:5) + 0:5bvcd; if "in" is chosen, the total surplus is V (s):
Therefore, the di¤erence of the surplus between the two regimes satises 2(W 1   W 2)(B) =R bs
0:5
V (s)  (V (0:5) + 0:5bvcd)ds = R bs0:5W (s) W (0:5)  v0:5 + (s  1)Bds: Then,
(A0): 2d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
=
R bs
0:5
(s  1)ds+ (V (bs)  V (0:5)  0:5bvcd) dbsdB :
The rst part of the right hand side is negative. But V (bs) V (0:5) 0:5bvcd = V (bs) V (es) > 0
as V (es) = V (0:5)+0:5bvcd: Thus we have to prove the rst part outweighs the second one, to prove
that there is a negative upper bound for d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
. For this purpose, we have to estimate dbs
dB
and V (bs)  V (0:5)  0:5bvcd:
By lemma 2, bs is dened by V (bs) = bT + V (1
2
) where bT > 0:5bvcd:is the solution of Ps
problem when she is o¤ering the tioli maxT Pr(V (s)   T )  V (0:5))(T   0:5bvcd): By variable
transformation V (s) = T + V (0:5); the problem becomes maxs(1   s)(V (s)   V (0:5)   0:5bvcd)
and bs is the solution. By the argument of lemma 2, it satises the rst order condition  V (bs)+
V (0:5)+ 0:5bvcd+ (1  bs)(vbs+B) = 0,  W (bs) +W (0:5)+ 0:5v0:5+ (1  bs)(vbs+2B) = 0; given
that V 0(s) = vcd(es) = vs +B: Applying W 0 = vs; by implicit function theorem, we have
(A1): dbs
dB
= 2(1 bs)
2vbs+2B (1 bs)v0bse0bs :
Lemma A1 : when c000e (:)  0 and v000(:)  0; es is concave.
Proof: es is decided by the rst order condition sv0 = c0e: Then e
00(s) = v
00(c00 sv00) v0(c000 v00 sv000)
(c00 sv00)2 <
0 given the conditions in the lemma and v0 > 0; c00 > 0; v00 < 0. QED.
As v(s) is the compound of a concave function v(e) with another concave function e(s), by
the lemma vs is also concave.
Lemma A2 : dbs
dB
< 2(1 bs)
vbs :
Proof : As vs is also concave and v0 = 0; vs  v0se0ss: Obviously bs > 0:5: Therefore vbs 
v0bse0bsbs > v0bse0bs(1  bs): Then 2vbs + 2B   (1  bs)v0bse0bs > vbs: This lemma then follows (A1). QED.
Lemma A3: If f(t) is concave and f(0) = 0; f(s)
f(t)
 s
t
for 0 < s < t:
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Proof : f(s) = f( s
t
t+ t s
t
0)  s
t
f(t) + t s
t
f(0): QED.
Lemma A4 : if f(t) is concave, then
R b
a
f(t)dt  f( b+a
2
)(b  a):
Proof : for any x 2 [0; b a
2
]; f( b+a
2
)  f( b+a
2
  x)  f 0( b+a
2
)x  f( b+a
2
+ x)  f( b+a
2
): QED.
Lemma A5 : bs  p3
2
:
Proof: Since vs is also concave, vcd(es) = vs + B is also concave. Then V (bs)   V (0:5) >
0:5vcd(e0:5) ,
R bs
0:5
vcd(es) > 0:5vcd(e0:5)jby lemma A4 ) vcd(e(bs+0:52 ))(bs   0:5) > 0:5vcd(e0:5) )
2(bs   0:5) > vcd(e0:5)
vcd(e(
bs+0:5
2
))
jby lemma A3 > 0:5bs+0:5
2
: From the last inequality, we have bs2   0:25 > 0:5:
QED.
We have done enough to estimate dbs
dB
: Now we come to V (bs)  V (0:5)  0:5bvcd:
Lemma A6 : V (bs)  V (0:5)  0:5bvcd < bsvbs   v0:5:
Proof : V (bs)  (V (0:5)+0:5bvcd) = bs(vbs+B)  ce(ebs)  (v0:5+B  ce(e0:5)) = bsvbs  v0:5  (1 
bs)B   (ce(ebs)  ce(e0:5)) < bsvbs   v0:5; since 0:5 < bs < 1: Q.E.D.
By (A0), Lemmas A3 and A6, 2d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
<  (bs   0:5)(1   bs+0:5
2
) + (bsvbs   v0:5)2(1 bs)vbs 
 (bs 0:5)(1  bs+0:5
2
)+2(1 bs)(bs  0:5bs ); where the last inequality applies bsvbs v0:5vbs = bs  v0:5vbs  bs  0:5bs
by lemma A3. To show that d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
is upper bounded by a strictly negative constant, it
su¢ ces to show that min
1bsp3
2
(bs   0:5)(1   bs+0:5
2
)   2(1   bs)(bs   0:5bs ) > 0; where bs  p32 is
from lemma A5. Rearrange the terms, (bs   0:5)(1   bs+0:5
2
)   2(1   bs)(bs   0:5bs ) = 14bsg(bs); where
g(s) = 6s3   4s2   5:5s+ 4: To show min
1s
p
3
2
g(s)
4s
> 0; it su¢ ces to show min
1s
p
3
2
g(s) > 0:
It is easy to check that in [0:5; 1]; g0(s) = 0 has unique solution s = 4+
p
115
18
<
p
3
2
; and that
g0(1) > 0: Therefore g0(s) > 0 for s 2 [
p
3
2
; 1]: Therefore min
1s
p
3
2
g(s) = g(
p
3
2
) > 0: Let
 = 1
2
min
1s
p
3
2
g(s)
4s
> 0: Then we have proven that d(W
1 W 2)(B)
dB
<  : Q.E.D.
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The Proof of Lemma 13 of Chapter Three (the optimal contracts under
B-model)
l0(C) and l1(C) are decided as follows. For the investorsproblem, (G21b) is binding; otherwise,
l1 could be lowered, which only loosens (IR-Ib). Thus, we have
(A1) D2 = 2l1d2 + (1  l1)l0d1:
Similarly (G10b) is binding; otherwise, l0 can be lowered. That is,
(A2): D1 = l0d1:
(P21b) is binding. Otherwise, consider the mechanism D1 = D2 = d1 = 2d2; l0 = 1; l1 = l2 =
0: It implements the benet of cross subsidization, but does not give the rent to Ms X, which
is impossible to achieve. This mechanism satises all the constraints but (P21b). Therefore,
(P21b) must be binding:
(A3): 2d2  D2 = (1  l1)(d1 + d2  D1):
Lastly, (IR-Ib) is binding:
(A4): q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1 = 2 + C2[1  q)2l0 + 2q(1  q)l1]:
All other constraints, (G20b), (P12b) and (IR-X), will be veried not binding. The entre-
preneursproblem is to minimize dB = qd2 + (1  q)d1; s.t. (A1)-(A4).
Substituting (A1) and (A2) into (A3), we get a link between d1 and d2 : 2d2   [2l1d2 + (1 
l1)l0d1] = (1 l1)[d2+(1 l0)d1], (1 l1)[2d2 l0d1] = (1 l1)[d2+(1 l0)d1], (1 l1)(d2 d1) =
0: Then, two subcases could arises, either l1 = 1; or d2 = d1: They are examined one by one.
If d2 = d1 = dB; by (A1) D1 = l0dB and by (A2) D2 = (2l1 + l0   l0l1)dB: Substitute
these into (A4), we have dB = 1
q
2+C2[(1 q)2l0+2q(1 q)l1]
2ql1+(2 q)l0 ql0l1 : Applying (
a+bx
c+dx
)0 = bc ad
(c+dx)2
, we have @d
B
@l0
=
1
q
 2(2+q+ql1)+2q(1 q)C2l1(ql1 1)
[2ql1+(2 q)l0 ql0l1]2 : 2(2+q+ql1)  0 and ql1 1 < 0; so that @d
B
@l0
< 0 and the optimal
l0 = 1: Similarly, @d
B
@l1
jl0=1 =  2+(1 q)C2(3 q)[2ql1+(2 q)l0 ql0l1]2 > 0, where C2(1  q)(3  q) > 2 because C2  C 
1
1 q (by Assumption 2 (2(1 q)C (1 q)C  qR (1 q)C  1): Therefore, the optimal l1 = 0:
100
Substitute l0 = 1 and l1 = 0 into the formula of dB, and we have dB =
2+C2(1 q)2
2q q2 = d2 = d1; and
into (A1) and (A2) we have D1 = D2 = d1 = dB:
If l1 = 1; by (A2) D2 = 2d2: As D2  2l0d2 ((G20b)), we get l0 = 1: By (A1) D1 = d1: Then
the objective dB = qD2
2
+ (1  q)D1: The RHS of (IR-Ib) equals 2qdB: As l0 = l1 = 1; the LHS
of (A4) equals 2 + C2[(1  q)2 + 2q(1  q)]: Therefore dB = 2+C2(1 q2)2q :
Compare the two subcases. 2+C2(1 q
2)
2q
> 2+C2(1 q)
2
2q q2 , C2(1  q)(3  q) > 2, which is proven
to hold as above. Thus, the rst subcase is the solution of the minimization problem. Therefore
the optimal mechanism is d2 = d1 = D1 = D2 = dB =
2+C2(1 q)2
2q q2 ; l0 = 1 and l1 = 0: It is easy to
check that the mechanism satises (G20b) and (P12b), and Ms X obtains net rent so that her
IR is not binding.
Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 14 of Chapter Three
If  = 0:5; (hb) becomes qzp
q(1 q) =
1 (h)
(h)
: limh! 1
1 (h)
(h)
= 1 and by LHospitals rule,
limh!+1
1 (h)
(h)
= limh!+1
 (h)
 (h)h = 0: And I am going to prove that
1 (h)
(h)
is decreasing, which
implies the equation has a unique solution. f1 (h)
(h)
g0 = (1 (h))h (h)
(h)
: f(1   (h))h   (h)g0 =
1 (h) > 0; and limh!+1(1 (h))h (h) = limh!+1(1 (h))h = limh!+1 1 (h)h 1 jLHospital =
limh!+1 h2(h) = 0: Therefore, (1  (h))h  (h) < 0 for nite h: Then f1 (h)(h) g0 < 0:
If  > 0:5; By (hb) when N ! 1; 1 (h)
(h)
! 1: Thus hBN !  1: Then 1   (h) ! 1 and
(hb) becomes (h) 1 = qzp
q(1 q)N
 0:5: As (h) = 1p
2
e 
h2
2 ;
p
2e
h2
2 = qzp
q(1 q)N
 0:5 ) h2
2

(  0:5) logN ) h   p(2  1) logN:
Q.E.D.
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The Proof of Lemma 15 of Chapter Three (the optimal contracts under
H-model)
Many steps are parallel to the proof of Lemma 2. We gure out l0(D1; D2) and l1(D1; D2) rst.
(G21h) is binding, to minimize l1; which pins down l1 = D2 D12R D1 : l0 is present in both (G10h)
and (G20h), which implies l0  D1R and l0  1  
q
1  D2
2R
respectively. Thus the minimum
l0 = max(
D1
R
; 1 
q
1  D2
2R
): Then, given (D1; D2); the optimal l0 and l1 are
(B1): (l0; l1) = (max(D1R ; 1 
q
1  D2
2R
); D2 D1
2R D1 ):
Let Cv = 2C[(1  q)2l0 + q(1  q)l1] (the total auditing costs), m1 = d1 D1 (the rent to Ms
X in state 1), m2 = 2d2 D2 (the rent in state 2), and V = 2q(1  q)m1+ q2m2 (the total rent).
Then the total nancial costs are 2 +Cv + V , which the entrepreneurs want to minimize. Using
these notations, (P21h) becomes m2  2(1  l1)m1 +D2   2l1R; and (P12h) m1  m2 D22 : The
entrepreneurs want to minimize (m1;m2) subject to nonnegative constraint. Let m1 = 0 and
m2 = D2   2l1R, which makes (P21h) binding. Then by (B1), m2 = (2R D2)D12R D1  0; and (P12h)
is equivalent to 0   l1R, unbinding. Thus, in the optimization,
(B2): (m1;m2) = (0; D2   2l1R):
Lastly, the (IR-Ih) is binding. Thus,
(B3): q2D2 + 2q(1  q)D1 = 2 + 2[(1  q)2l0(D1; D2) + q(1  q)l1(D1; D2)]C:
(B3) implicitly denes a function D2(D1): f(D1; D2)jD2 = D2(D1)g is the set of all feasible
securities. If the repayment in state 1 (D1) decreases, as compensation, the repayment in state
2 (D2) has to increase. Use "0" represents the derivative with respect to D1: Then, D02 < 0.
The entrepreneursproblem becomes: minD1;D2 V + Cv; s.t. (B1)-(B3).
Lemma 4 asserts that the minimization happens at D1 = D2: As D1  D2 is assumed, to
prove that, it su¢ ces to show that (V + Cv)
0 < 0 everywhere. As l0 = max(1 
q
1  D2
2R
; D1
R
); I
consider two subcases depending whether 1 
q
1  D2
2R
 D1
R
or not.
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Consider rst the subcase where 1 
q
1  D2
2R
 D1
R
and thus l0 = D1R : To get an explicit trade-
o¤ between the rent (V ) and the auditing costs (Cv), notice that V = q
2m2 = q
2D2   2q2Rl1 )
q2D2 = V + 2q
2Rl1: And l0 = D1R ) D1 = l0R: Let l  ql1 + (1   q)l0 and substitute these
into (B3), we get V + 2q2l1R + 2q(1   q)l0R = 2 + 2(1   q)Cl , V + 2qRl = 2 + 2(1  
q)Cl , V + 2(qR   (1   q)C)l = 2: As l = Cv
2(1 q)C ; it follows that V +
qR (1 q)C
(1 q)C Cv = 2: Then
(V + Cv)
0 = qR 2(1 q)C
qR (1 q)C V
0: By Assumption 2, qR   2(1   q)C  0: V = q2m2. Notice that
m2 = D2   2l1R = (2R D2)D12R D1 : @m2@D1 > 0, @m2@D2 < 0; and D02 < 0: Hence V 0 = q2m02 > 0 and
(V + Cv)
0 < 0:
Consider the subcase where 1  
q
1  D2
2R
> D1
R
and thus l0 = 1  
q
1  D2
2R
: Then, l00 =
dl0
dD2
D02 < 0: As V +Cv = q
2D2 2q2Rl1+2C[(1 q)2l0+q(1 q)l1] = q2D2 2qSl1+2C(1 q)2l0
(remember S = qR (1 q)C), (V +Cv)0 = q2D02 2qSl01+2C(1 q)2l00 < q2D02 2qSl01: It su¢ ces
to prove that q2D02   2qSl01 < 0. By (B3), q2D02 + 2q(1  q) = 2(1  q)2Cl00 + 2q(1  q)Cl01: q2D02
is smaller than the LHS of this equation, and the RHS is smaller than 2q(1   q)Cl01; as l00 < 0:
Therefore, q2D02 < 2q(1 q)Cl01: Then, q2D02 2qSl01 < 2q(1 q)Cl01 2qSl01 = 2q[(1 q)C S]l01 <
0; where for the last inequality we applies (1 q)C S = 2(1 q)C qR  0 and l01 < 0 (l1 = D2 D12R D1
so that @l1
@D1
< 0 and @l1
@D2
> 0). Therefore, (V + Cv)
0 < 0 in this subcase.
Summing up, the solution to the entrepreneursproblem is D1 = D2 = D: Accordingly, by
(B1), l1 = 0; l0 = DR : Substituting all these into (B3), we have [q
2+2q(1 q)]D = 2+2C(1 q)2D
R
;
which implies D = 2R
q2R+2(1 q)S : By (B2), m1 = 0;m2 = D2 = D: Then d1 = D1 +m1 = D; d2 =
m2+D2
2
= D: D  R (limited liability for the entrepreneurs) is satised, since q2R+2(1 q)S  2;
which holds true because 2S  2 and qR  2 by Assumption 2.
Q.E.D.
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The Proof of Lemma 16 of Chapter Three
The FOC is 1 = Cp
q(1 q)R
1
(1 (h))2 [
q
1
N
G(h)(h) + (
q
1
N
G(h))0(1 (h))]: To simplify the FOC,
we have the following lemma.
Lemma A1: When N ! 1; if h !  1 and h logN = o(pN); then
q
1
N
G(h) q
1 q
q
(h) log
p
Nq(1  q) and (
q
1
N
G(h))0   
q
1 q
q
(h)h log
p
Nq(1  q):
Proof: Let " = 1p
Nq(1 q) : Then
q
1
N
G(h) =
R h "
 1
(1 q)  tp
N
p
q(1 q)
(h t)
p
q(1 q) (t)dt 
R h "
 1
(1 q)p
q(1 q)(h t)(t)dt =q
1 q
q
R h "
 1
1
h t(t)dt; where the rst " " applies tpN = o(1  q): And similarly, (
q
1
N
G(h))0 q
1 q
q
(
R h "
 1
1
h t(t)dt)
0 =
q
1 q
q
[  log "(h  ")  R h " 1 log(h  t)(t)tdt]0 =  q1 qq R h " 1 (t)th t dt:
I show that under the conditions of the lemma,
R h "
 1
1
h t(t)dt    log "(h): Using integration
by parts,
R h "
 1
1
h t(t)dt =   log "(h  ") 
R h "
 1 log(h  t)(t)tdt: Notice that when "! 0 and
h!  1; both integrations of the equation are dominated by the value of the integrate functions
at t = h  ": For the former, the value is 1
"
(h  ") and for the latter it is log "(h  ")(h  "):
By the conditions of the lemma, log "(h  ") = o(1
"
); Thus the latter integration is in the lower
rank of the former one. Therefore,   log "(h  ") is the principal part of R h " 1 1h t(t)dt:
  R h " 1 (t)th t dt = R h " 1 (t)td log(h  t) = (h  ")(h  ") log "+ R h " 1 log(h  t)(t2   1)(t)dt:
A similar argument establishes that   R h " 1 (t)th t dt  (h)h log "; which proves the second part
of the lemma. q.e.d.
We verify it later that the conditions of Lemma A1 are satised. By the lemma, the FOC
becomes 1 = C
qR
log
p
Nq(1  q) (h)h(1 (h))+(h)2
(1 (h))2 : Thus, when N ! 1; h !  1 or +1:
As the default probability is (h); h ! +1 is never possible. Another way to see this is to
gure out (h)
2 (h)h(1 (h))
(1 (h))2 ! 1 when h! +1: Therefore, h!  1: Thus, 1  (h)! 1 and
(h)2 = o((h)h) :The FOC becomes 1 = C
qR
log
p
Nq(1  q)(h)( h))
(C1): (h) 1  C
2qR
( h) logN:
That implies that h
2
2
 log( h)+log logN: Therefore, h = o(logN); and h =  p2 log logN+
o: It is veried that the conditions of Lemma A1 are satised for this h:
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By Lemma A1,
q
1
N
G(h) = O((h) logN) = O( 1 h); where the second equation applies
(h) logN = O( h 1) by (C1). Then G(h)
N
= O( 1 hpN ) = o(
 hp
N
):
Q.E.D.
The Proof of Lemma 17 of Chapter Three
As k
N
! q
1+m
; it su¢ ces to prove the lemma for N = k 1+m
q
: let  = q
1+m
= k
N
: An intuitive
proof of the lemma is as follows. E( 1
k s js  k   1) =
pk 11+pk 2 12+:::+p0 1k
pk 1+pk 2+:::+p0
=
1+
pk 2
pk 1
 1
2
+:::
p0
pk 1
 1
k
1+
pk 2
pk 1
+:::
p0
pk 1
:
For given N; pk i
pk 1
=
Ck iN q
k i(1 q)N k+i
Ck 1N qk 1(1 q)N k+1
= (1 q
q
)i 1 (k 1)(k 2):::(k i+1)
(N k+i)(N k+i 1):::(N k+2) ; where C
i
N =
N !
i!(N i)!
is the combination number. Given N is big, k 1
N k+i  k 2N k+i 1  ::: k i+1N k+2  kN k = 1  :
Then pk i
pk 1
 ( (1 q)
q(1 ))
i 1 =: i 1; where  = (1 q)
q(1 ) < 1 as  < q: Then, E(
1
k s js  k   1) 
1+ 1
2
+:::k 1 1
k
1++:::k 1 =
1 

R 
0
1 tk
1 t dt
1 k ! 1  log 11  when k !1:
For a strict proof, rst I establish that E( 1
k s js  k   1) 
1+ 1
2
+:::k 1 1
k
1++:::k 1 : Notice that
(k 1)(k 2):::(k i+1)
(N k+i)(N k+i 1):::(N k+2) < (
k
N k )
i 1; and hence pk i
pk 1
< i 1: Similarly, pk i
pk j
< i j for any
i > j: The following lemma is useful to establish the inequality.
Lemma A2: If ai+1
ai
< ; then a1+a2
1
2
+:::ak
1
k
a1+a2+:::ak
 1+ 12+:::k 1 1k
1++:::k 1 :
Proof: By mathematical induction. For k = 1, that is surely true. Assume for k, the
inequality holds true. Consider the case for k+1: Let Vk =
a1+a2
1
2
+:::ak
1
k
a1+a2+:::ak
andWk =
1+ 1
2
+:::k 1 1
k
1++:::k 1 :
By the induction assumption Vk  Wk: Both Vk andWk are the convex combination of 1 through
1
k
: Thus both are bigger than 1
k+1
: Notice that ak+1
a1+a2+:::ak+1
< 
k
1++:::k
; as it, a1
ak+1
+ a2
ak+1
+ :::1 >
 k +  (k 1) + :::1; which is true because ai
ak+1
= ai
ai+1
 aI+1
ai+2
::: ak
ak+1
> ( 1

)k+1 i for any i = 1; 2::k:
Then Vk+1 =
a1+a2+:::ak
a1+a2+:::ak+1
Vk +
ak+1
a1+a2+:::ak+1
1
k+1
> 1++:::
k 1
1++:::k
Vk +
k
1++:::k
1
k+1
 1++:::k 1
1++:::k
Wk +
k
1++:::k
1
k+1
= Wk+1; where the rst inequality applies Vk > 1k+1 and the second one applies
Vk  Wk: q.e.d.
By the lemma, pk 11+pk 2
1
2
+:::+p0
1
k
pk 1+pk 2+:::+p0
 1+ 12+:::k 1 1k
1++:::k 1 , that is E(
1
k s js  k 1) 
1+ 1
2
+:::k 1 1
k
1++:::k 1 :
Then limk!1E( 1k s js  k   1)  limk!1
1+ 1
2
+:::k 1 1
k
1++:::k 1 =
1 

log 1
1  :
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For the other direction of the inequality, I need to recover notation psN ; rather than use
its simplication ps: For any L < k;
pk 1N 1+pk 2N  12+:::+p0N 1k
pk 1N +p
k 2
N +:::+p
0
N
<
pk 1N 1+pk 2N  12+:::+pk LN 1L
pk 1N +p
k 2
N +:::+p
k L
N
; because the
former is the convex combination of the latter and 1
L+1
; 1
L+2
::: 1
K
; which are all smaller than the
it. For this inequality, keep L xed and let N (thus k = q
1+m
N) goes to innity. Then the
left hand side goes to limk!1E( 1k s js  k   1): The right hand side goes to
1+ 1
2
+:::L 1 1
L
1++:::L 1 ;
because pk i
pk 1
= (1 q
q
)i 1 (k 1)(k 2):::(k i+1)
(N k+i)(N k+i 1):::(N k+2) ! i 1 for any given i  L: Therefore, for
any given L; limk!1E( 1k s js  k   1) 
1+ 1
2
+:::L 1 1
L
1++:::L 1 : Let L then goes to innity. We have
limk!1E( 1k s js  k   1)  1  log 11  :
Therefore, limk!1E( 1k s js  k 1) = 1  log 11  : Substitute  = (1 q)q(1 ) =
(1 q) q
1+m
q 1+m q
1+m
= 1 q
1 q+m :
Then 1 

log 1
1  =
m
1 q log
1 q+m
m
:
Q.E.D.
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